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ABSTRACT

TWO-SIDED SEARCH AND MATCHING: THEORY AND ESTIMATION

Seul Ki Shin

Kenneth Burdett
Kenneth I. Wolpin

Frictions are a potentially important feature of many two-sided settings, for example, in the
marriage market. My dissertation develops and estimates two-sided search and matching
models and uses them to assess the importance of frictions in explaining observed marriage
patterns. In the models, unmatched individuals search for long-term partners. Opportunities to meet potential partners arrive over time at uncertain intervals. Individuals are of
different observable discrete types (e.g., gender and race/ethnicity) and types vary in their
proportions within the population. Types may also differ in their type-pair specific utilities
of marrying and their likelihood of meeting certain types of potential spouses.
The first chapter in my dissertation proposes a new identification approach to separately estimate type-specific preferences and opportunities. I implement the technique
to understand the marital patterns of racial and ethnic groups in the United States and to
analyze the reasons for a high degree of same-type marriages. The second chapter theoretically analyzes the implications of the assumption that people prefer same-type partners. I
show that frameworks with and without search frictions deliver different insights about the
effects of group size on matching outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Preferences vs. Opportunities:
Racial/Ethnic Intermarriage in the
United States

This chapter develops and implements a new approach for separately identifying preference
and opportunity parameters of a two-sided search and matching model in the absence of
data on choice sets. This approach exploits information on the dynamics of matches: how
long it takes for singles to form matches, what types of matches they form, and how long
the matches last. Willingness to accept a certain type of partner can be revealed through
the dissolution of matches. Given recovered acceptance rules, the rates at which singles
meet different types are inferred from the observed transitions from singlehood to matches.
Imposing equilibrium conditions links acceptance rules and arrival rates to underlying preference and opportunity parameters. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I apply
this method to examine the marriage patterns of non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks
and Hispanics in the United States. Results indicate that the observed infrequency of intermarriage is primarily attributable to a low incidence of interracial/interethnic meetings
rather than same-race/ethnicity preferences. Simulations based on the estimated model predict the effects of demographic changes on marital patterns.

1

1.1

Introduction
“People can have the Model T in any color they want – as long as it’s black.”
(Henry Ford)
As Henry Ford observed, people make choices based on the opportunities they have.1

Unless the limitations on choice sets are carefully considered, interpretation of preferences
based on final choices could be misleading. In some cases, however, researchers are unable to observe the set from which the final option was chosen. For example, in contexts
where individuals experience match opportunities (meetings) and decide which matches to
form, what is observed in the data is usually final matches as opposed to all meetings. Confronting this challenge, I develop a new approach for separately identifying preference and
opportunity parameters of a two-sided search and matching model in the absence of data
on meetings. This identification strategy exploits information on the dynamics, formation
and dissolution, of final matches. I implement this method to study the marriage patterns
in the United States, which are characterized by high frequencies of same-race marriages
(racial homogamy).
In 2011, 93.8% of married whites, 88.6% of married blacks, and 80.2% of married
Hispanics had spouses of the same racial group, whereas their shares of the U.S. population were 64.5%, 12.8%, and 16.3%.2 This marriage pattern has received widespread
scholarly and public attention concerning the causes and consequences of within-group
and between-group marriages in relation to the salience of cultural distinctions and atti1 The

original remark found in his biography was “Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he
wants so long as it is black." (Ford and Crowther 1922) Since the color black was the only available option
for customers who bought a Model T produced by the Ford Motor Company from 1908 and 1927, this color
choice by consumers could not reflect their preferences.
2 Source: PSID 2011 for homogamous marriage rates and Current Population Survey 2011 for population
shares. Throughout the paper, whites and blacks refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks. Race
refers to racial and ethnic distinctions.
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tudes towards other groups.3 This paper focuses on two potential sources of homogamy.
First, homogamy may stem from people’s preferences for spouses of the same type.4 Second, homogamy may reflect people’s more frequent opportunities to meet members of their
own group, which may be a consequence of a high degree of residential and school segregation.5 Although the two factors, preferences and opportunities, have distinct roles in
marital decisions, little is known about the relative strength of each channel.
In this paper, I construct and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of the marriage
market with transferable utility and search frictions, building on Shimer and Smith (2000)
and Jacquemet and Robin (2013). Individuals, who differ by gender and race (type), are
either single or married. Singles meet different types of potential spouses and jointly decide
whether to marry based on type-specific marital utilities and idiosyncratic match quality.
Couples may receive new match quality and decide whether to divorce. The model allows
marital preferences and opportunities to differ for all possible combinations of male and
female types.6 For example, black male - black female marriages may generate different
utility than white male - black female marriages. The rate at which males meet a black
female as a potential spouse (the arrival rate of black females) depends not only on the
percentage of black females among singles, but also on male types through opportunity
parameters that I introduce.
I estimate the model using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The data include longitudinal information on individuals’ marriage transitions from 1968
to 2011: how long individuals stay single, whom they marry, and how long their marriages
last. The estimation of the model is done by three steps which entail technical innovations.
3 See

Kalmijn (1998), Fryer (2007), Bisin and Verdier (2011) and Schwartz (2013) for an overview of this
topic.
4 Obstacles to interracial marriages have been cited as differences in cultural backgrounds and the negative
social responses from family and community (Dalmage 2000, Childs 2005, Bratter and King 2008).
5 See Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999), Easterly (2009) and Orfield, Kuscera, and Siegel-Hawley (2012)
for evidence on the high degree of residential and school segregation.
6 The model is silent on how types, and their preferences and opportunities, are determined. (See Bisin,
Topa, and Verdier 2004 for an alternative setting.) I focus on the role of preferences and opportunities in
explaining individual marriage histories, whereas Bisin et al. focus on cultural transmission and evolution of
types across generations. Evidence for exogenous meeting opportunities is provided in Section 1.5.4.
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In the first step, hazard rates of marital formation and dissolution are estimated based on
duration analysis. In the second step, given the assumption that the evolution of match
quality does not depend on marriage types, willingness to accept a spouse of a different
type can be revealed through marital dissolution. Once acceptance rules are recovered,
the rates at which singles meet different types are inferred from data on marital formation.
Finally, imposing equilibrium conditions links acceptance rules and arrival rates to underlying preference and opportunity parameters for all possible pairings of whites, blacks, and
Hispanics in the United States.
As a brief intuition of the identification strategy, consider the observation that most
black females marry blacks rather than whites. If this pattern is explained by that people
find black - black (BB) marriages more acceptable than white male - black female (W B)
marriages, we would expect that BB marriages to be more persistent. However, W B marriages are estimated to be more stable than BB marriages, which signals that people may
accept W B marriages relatively easily if they meet. Then, the only way to explain the infrequent formation of W B marriages is the opportunity channel, which means W B meetings
are rare. In other words, while marriage formation is affected both by type-specific acceptance and arrivals, divorce is affected only by the degree of acceptance. Thus, by examining
formation and dissolution of matches simultaneously, I can infer frequencies of different
meetings without directly observing how people meet.
The estimates reveal significant differences among racial groups in their structural
parameters. Hispanics value their homogamous marriage more than whites do, while blacks
value it less. Same-race preferences are shown in the sense that two racial groups find
forming two types of homogamous marriages more beneficial than forming interracial marriages. The sum of utilities of white - white and Hispanic - Hispanic marriages is higher
than the total utilities from white - Hispanic and Hispanic - white marriages (WW + HH
 W H + HW ), which is also the case between blacks and Hispanics.7 In addition, singles
7 This

inequality between whites and blacks, WW + BB  W B + BW , is not statistically significant.
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receive greater opportunities to meet members of their own groups than the rates implied
by uniformly random meeting.
The estimated parameters imply that both preferences and opportunities play important roles in explaining observed marital patterns. Because of same-race preferences,
people accept same-race meetings more easily than interracial meetings, with the ratio of
0.81. Homogamous marriages are, on average, more stable than interracial unions, but
marital stability varies by the racial composition of the couple. Moreover, differences in
marital stability are not dramatic enough to explain all of the observed infrequency of interracial marriages, suggesting the role of opportunities, that is, meetings are also subject to
the same-race bias. If meetings were random, 36.3% of meetings would be interracial. In
contrast, since individuals tend to meet members of the same group more frequently, only
8.0% of meetings are estimated to be across races. Hispanics, although they face more interracial meeting opportunities, more selectively accept homogamous meetings than other
groups do.
To compare the relative importance of preferences and opportunities in explaining
racial homogamy, I use the estimated model to perform counterfactual experiments. Eliminating preference heterogeneity has only a limited effect on the homogamy patterns, while
eliminating differences in meeting frequency significantly increases the incidence of interracial marriages. Across racial types, opportunities explain 91.6%, 94.6%, and 80.7%
of homogamy patterns of whites, blacks and Hispanics. The results suggest that the high
probabilities of individuals marrying spouses of the same race are primarily attributable to
frequent incidences of intragroup meetings rather than same-race preferences.
The model further offers predictions on how marital outcomes correspond to demographic changes. In the hypothetical situation where, for example, the gender ratio
of blacks becomes more balanced, which could potentially occur if the incarceration and
mortality rates of black males decreased, the marriage rate for black females increases by
6.6-10.0%. However, only 16-22% of the white-black gap in marriage rates would disap-

5

pear after the increased availability of potential spouses. Lastly, I use the model to predict
the effects of an increasing Hispanic population. Analysis based on expected population
distribution in year 2050 projects that Hispanics will meet their same-race spouses more
easily at that time, leading to an increase in Hispanic intramarriages and a higher degree of
racial homogamy.
This paper contributes to three bodies of literature. The first is the literature that
structurally estimates equilibrium models of the marriage market. Following pioneering
work by Becker (1973, 1974), economists have investigated the marriage market. Because
marriage is the foundation of the family, where major economic decisions (e.g., consumption, labor supply, and human capital investment) are made and children learn values and
virtues, understanding how marriages are formed and function is crucial for economics and
society.8 Choo and Siow (2006b) first propose and estimate a frictionless marriage market
model, which is extended by Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2012), and Dupuy and Galichon (2012) among many others. In contrast, Jacquemet and Robin (2013) and Goussé
(2012) use frictional models to measure the gains of marriages between agents who differ in traits such as income.9 Most related papers by Wong (2003b) and Bisin, Topa, and
Verdier (2004) focus on racial and religious dimensions respectively, estimating intolerance to intercultural marriages.10 However, these papers do not address factors involving
meeting opportunities in marriage, either because they adopt a frictionless setting where all
options are always available or frictional settings with random meetings where the arrival
rates of different spouses are type-independent.11 Since the observed proportions of final
8 There

is a large literature on the marriage market. The literature covers broader meaning of marriage,
that is, how people are matched with one another and form households. Extensive reviews of the literature
can be found in Becker (1993), Stevenson and Wolfers (2007), Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2011).
9 Jacquemet and Robin (2013) rigorously examine the intra-household bargaining based labor supply and
home production decisions and Goussé (2012) incorporates several traits including income, education and
physical attractiveness.
10 Wong (2003b) proposes a nontransferable utility model with uniformly random meeting. Bisin, Topa,
and Verdier (2004) allow agents to make costly decisions on whom they meet and marry. However, the
underlying search technology is assumed to be type-independent.
11 Sietz (2009) and Keane and Wolpin (2010) also build a model that can account for racial differences in
marital patterns. These models explain racial differences both in the marriage market and the labor market.
Keane and Wolpin (2010) only consider the female side of the market, and are silent on the racial identity
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matches are directly mapped into underlying preferences, the difference in marriage shares
may overstate the difference in marital preferences. Thus, estimated preferences for groups
who meet each other more frequently would tend to be upwardly biased.12
Second, mate preferences have previously been estimated in some settings where
researchers can observe both available options and choices. Fisman et al. (2008) designed
and conducted speed-dating experiments with voluntary participants. Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and
Ariely (2010a) and Lee (2009) and Banergee et al. (2013) use data from an online dating
site, a matchmaking company and newspaper matrimonial advertisements, respectively.
The results from these papers, however, may not be generalizable to the marriage context
of the whole population. In contrast, my estimation is based on population data and actual
marital decisions. Moreover, I identify heterogeneity in opportunities as well as differences
in preferences. With recovered preferences and opportunities, I can further explore and
quantify key mechanisms that generate marital patterns in terms of both formation and
dissolution.13
Third, Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009) propose and estimate a model to identify
the roles of meetings and preferences in friendship, characterized by the high frequency
of same-race friends. In their framework, because there is no rejection upon meeting, the
fraction of same-type friends recovers the meeting factor. They then recover preferences
based on variations in the number of friendships. Despite its novel features, the model they
develop is not appropriate for monogamous marriages. My identification strategy is general
enough to be applicable to any matching models with search frictions, such as two-sided
of spouse. Sietz (2009) assumes that marriage markets are segmented by race. Several papers consider the
marital opportunities only in a restrictive sense (for examples, as the availability related to gender ratio as
in Choo and Siow 2006a, Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos 2011). In the work of Logan, Hoff, and
Newton (2008), opportunities are restricted only by the preferences of the opposite side.
12 For example, Wong (2003b) quantifies the effect of racial taboos and that of differences in human capital
endowments on racial homogamy, finding that racial taboos explain 74% of intermarriage patterns. However,
since she does not control for opportunity differences, the role of same-race preferences may be overestimated.
13 It is worth emphasizing that my model predictions are broadly consistent with the findings from a randomized controlled experiment that shows more interracial matches under random arrivals. Fisman et al.
(2008) report that the acceptance probability of interracial meetings is 78% of the intrameeting acceptance
rate which is comparable to my findings.
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markets with workers and firms and buyers and sellers, and many-to-many sided markets,
where data on the dynamics of matches are available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the two-sided
search and matching model. After describing the data in Section 1.3, I demonstrate the
methods of recovering primitives and the implementation of the techniques in Section 1.4.
The estimated parameters of the model and results from counterfactual experiments are
presented in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 compares my framework to alternative frictionless
settings and discusses possible applications of my model. Section 1.7 provides a conclusion.

1.2

The Model

In this section I construct a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage formation and dissolution. The model presented here is an extension of the model of Jacquemet and Robin
(2013). Some model assumptions are driven by a desire to estimate not only marital preferences but also meeting opportunities.14

1.2.1

Environment

The marriage market is populated by men and women with the finite and discrete types,
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. The measure of each type among population is exf

f

f

m
m
f
ogenously given by gm = (gm
1 , g2 , ..., gI ) for males and g = (g1 , g2 , ..., gJ ) for females,

with the measure of females normalized to 1. Types represent social categories that determine the preferences and meeting environments of members of the group. Furthermore,
types are assumed to be exogenously given, invariant, and observed to other agents and the
14 Three

major extensions are made in addition to the settings of Jacquemet and Robin (2013): 1) endogenized divorce, 2) type- specific meetings as apposed to random meetings, and 3) discrete types. The first
extension was also made by Goussé (2012), while her model can be overidentified with her assumption of
random meetings. The discretized type space enables us to identify preference and opportunity parameters in
a new and straightforward way as introduced in Section 1.4.
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econometrician.15
Consider an infinite horizon and stationary environment with continuous time. Individuals, who discount the future with rate r, are either single or married. Singles and
married agents are ageless, but they face the risk of death that occurs according to the
Poisson parameter of δ . Couples are assumed to die together. New individuals are born as
single with the rate of δ , where the types of new agents are randomly drawn from the distrim
m
bution (gm , g f ). The measure of types among single is denoted by sm = (sm
1 , s2 , ..., sI ) for
f

f

f

f

f
males and s f = (s1 , s2 , ..., sJ ) for females with Sm = ∑i sm
i and S = ∑ j s j . These measures

(sm , s f ) are endogenously determined as one of the steady-state equilibrium objects.
Only singles search and meet potential spouses in the marriage market. Suppose
the number of meetings between male i and female j taking place per unit time is given
sm s

f

by Mi j = µi j M(Sm , S f ) Sim S jf . The function M(Sm , S f ) is assumed to be increasing in both
arguments, homogeneous of degree one and concave.16 The arrival rate of female j faced
by male i, which is the rate at which male i meets potential spouses of female j, is then given
by

Mi j
sm
i

m

= µi j M(SSm,S

f)

f

sj
Sf

≡ αimj (sm , s f ). The Poisson rate of meeting depends not only on the

gender ratio and the type of potential spouse but also on their own type through parameters
µi j . I thus allow pair-specific arrivals to capture the case where one type meets certain
types more frequently. For example, the arrival rate of black females, which depends on
the percentage of blacks in female singles, may differ for white and black males.
When male i and female j meet, they sample a match quality ε which is defined as an
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random draw from a known distribution
F(ε). F(ε) is assumed to be twice differentiable and strictly increasing over the interval
(−∞, ∞). ε is a stochastic and idiosyncratic component of marital utility and is assumed
15 i

type could be, for example, a white male who has above average height. Introducing additional traits
increases the dimension of the type space. I 6= J refers to the case where males and females have different
spouse evaluations with different traits that matter.
16 Despite its notation that conventionally denotes the total measure of meetings in search literature, M(Sm ,
f
S ) is not the total measure of meetings in my setting. The total measure of meetings is given by ∑i ∑ j Mi j =
sm s

f

j
∑i ∑ j µi j M(Sm , S f ) Sim S f . I thus allow that the total number of meetings at a given time depends not only on
the total number of male and female singles, but also on how types are distributed among singles.
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to be independent of the types of both sides. Given ε, the two singles first decide whether
to form a match or not. Therefore, meeting, which reflects search frictions in the marriage
market, is understood as a significant encounter between one male and one female that
involves the following: 1) a male and a female come together and consider each other as
potential spouses (availability); 2) they draw a match quality (learning); and 3) they jointly
decide whether to marry (decision).
If they decide to form a marriage, couples also determine how to divide the marital
surplus. They determine the amount of the transfer ti j (ε) to share the surplus from a match
in fixed proportion with the female’s share β .17 The division of marital surplus may take
several forms. For example, married couples may decide who does household chores, or
how to allocate household resources. In these instances, the increase in one’s utility often
accompanies the decrease in the utility of his or her spouse. I further assume that utilities
are perfectly transferable.18
In marriages between male i and female j, the husband i gets flow utility of um
ij +
f

f

σ ε2 − ti j (ε) and wife j gets ui j + σ ε2 + ti j (ε). um
i j and ui j are deterministic components
of utilities from marriage i j evaluated by male i and female j. These terms capture heterogeneity in preferences for different marriages. σ denotes the weight on the stochastic
f

component ε compared to the deterministic components, um
i j and ui j , which is also related
to the dispersion of match quality draws. With the introduction of (um , u f ) and σ , F(ε) can
be normalized to have mean 0 and variance 1 without loss of generality.19 In this model,
17 In

other words, they decide how to divide their marital surplus by determining the transfer ti j (ε) based
on the generalized Nash Bargaining with female bargaining weight β . The Nash Bargaining solution can be
achieved as a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of a properly designed non-cooperative bargaining game
under certain conditions (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1985). Note that under Nash bargaining, the decisions of
the male and the female always agree. They form a match with positive aggregate surplus. It can be easily
shown that Ui j (ε) −Ui ≥ 0 and Vi j (ε) −V j ≥ 0 if and only if Suri j (ε) ≥ 0.
18 There are more advantages of transferable utility compared to non-transferable utility: 1) it is not necessary to estimate separate male and female utilities; and 2) the absence of data on transfers and data on which
side initiates divorce may not be a problem. In this setting, individual marital surpluses are proportional to the
total surplus, and the decisions of the husband and wife always agree, which may be consistent with the altruistic nature of becoming one flesh. These features are more important than transferability itself, warranting
further development and implementation of the model.
19 Type-specific flow utility as single may be assumed, for male i , um and for female j, u f . However,
i
j
what matters and can be identified from observables is the gap between marital utility and singlehood utility,
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possible emotional and economic gains of marriage, such as commitment and fidelity, rearing children, joint production and consumption, sharing of public goods, and risk pooling,
are non-parametrically represented by utility terms, (um , u f ). The stochastic component, ε,
is then understood as a time-varying and match-specific disturbance from the mean.
Married couples are subject to the risk of divorce. With a Poisson process with rate
λ , couples draw a new match quality ε from the same distribution F(ε). Based upon this
new quality, couples decide to separate and return to the marriage market as a single person
or to stay married. I assume that λ , how frequently match qualities change, and F(.), the
distribution of match qualities, are common to all pairs.
To summarize, this is a dynamic model of the marriage market in which singles can
make decisions on marital formation upon meeting, and couples can make decisions on
marital separation upon updating their match quality. Key parameters are the marriage
opportunity parameters, µi j , which describe the bias of meeting frequencies from random
f

matching; and the marriage preference parameters, um
i j , ui j , which represent gains from
marriage i, j evaluated by i type husband and j type wife. Discussions on how certain
assumptions play their role in estimation and how I can relax them will be investigated in
Section 1.4.

1.2.2

Equilibrium

Optimal cutoff strategies
Assume first that the distributions (sm , s f ), and thus arrivals α m (sm , s f ), α f (sm , s f ) are
f

given. Let Uim and U j denote the expected lifetime value of staying single as a type i
f
f
m
um
i j − ui or ui j − u j . Thus, the flow utility in the single state is normalized to 0 and the marital utilities capture
payoff surplus compared to being single.
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male and as a type j female where expectation E is over ε̃.20
(r + δ )Uim =

∑ αilmEmax[Uilm(ε̃) −Uim, 0]

(1.1)

l
f

(r + δ )U j

∑ αkf j Emax[Ukfj (ε̃) −U jf , 0]

=

(1.2)

k
f

Uimj (ε) and Ui j (ε) are given as the expected lifetime value of being a husband of type i and
a wife of type j in their i j marriages with match quality ε.
ε
m
m
m
m
(r + δ )Uimj (ε) = um
i j + σ − ti j (ε) + λ Emax[Ui j (ε̃) −Ui j (ε),Ui −Ui j (ε)] (1.3)
2
ε
f
f
f
f
f
f
(r + δ )Ui j (ε) = ui j + σ + ti j (ε) + λ Emax[Ui j (ε̃) −Ui j (ε),U j −Ui j (ε)] (1.4)
2
Let Zi j (ε) denote the expected lifetime value of marital surplus between male i and
female j. With transferable utility, both agents’ decision on marriage or divorce agree, and
they split their surplus based on the female bargaining weight β as follows.21
f

f

Zi j (ε) ≡ Uimj (ε) +Ui j (ε) −Uim −U j

(1.6)

Uimj (ε) −Uim = (1 − β ) Zi j (ε)
f

f

Ui j (ε) −U j

(1.7)

= β Zi j (ε)

(1.8)

Zi j (ε) is also written as
f

(r + δ + λ )Zi j (ε) = um
i j + ui j + σ ε + λ Emax[Zi j (ε̃), 0]
f

−(1 − β ) ∑ αilm Emax[Zil (ε̃), 0] − β ∑ αk j Emax[Zk j (ε̃), 0].(1.9)
l
20 See

k

the Appendix 3.1.3 for a derivation.
is obtained based on the generalized Nash Bargaining by finding the first order condition of the

21 This

equation
max(Uimj (ε) −Uim )1−β (Uifj (ε) −U jf )β .
ti j (ε)
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(1.5)

Because Zi j (ε) increases in ε as in equation (1.9), agents use the cutoff strategy
εi∗j such that Zi j (εi∗j ) = 0 in optimal decisions. Under this stationary environment, the
reservation match quality εi∗j governs both formation and separation. If and only if ε is
higher than the reservation match quality εi∗j , singles form the potential match or couples
continue their marriage. These cutoff strategies yield simpler representations of Zi j (εi∗j ),
´∞
f
Uim and U j where we define ϕ(ε ∗ ) ≡ ε ∗ [1 − F(x)]dx for the expected match surplus in a
flow term when ε ∗ is the reservation match quality.22
f

∗
(r + δ )Zi j (εi∗j ) = um
i j + ui j + σ εi j +

(r + δ )Uim =
f

(r + δ )U j =

σλ
f
ϕ(εi∗j ) − (r + δ )Uim − (r + δ )U j = 0 (1.10)
r+δ +λ

σ (1 − β )
r+δ +λ

∑ αilm ϕ(εil∗)

σβ
r+δ +λ

∑ αkf j ϕ(εk∗j )

(1.11)

l

(1.12)

k

Finally, the following system of equations with I × J number of unknowns εi∗j constitutes
the marriage market equilibrium given arrival rates. The reservation match quality equates
the value from being married (the left side of equation (1.13),
the value from being single (the right side of equation (1.13),

f ∗
r+δ
m ∗
σ [Ui j (εi j ) + Ui j (εi j )])

to

f
r+δ
m
σ [Ui +U j ]).

f

εi∗j +

um
λ
i j + ui j
∗
ϕ(εi j ) +
=
r+δ +λ
σ
1
f
{(1 − β ) ∑ αilm (sm , s f )ϕ(εil∗ ) + β ∑ αk j (sm , s f )ϕ(εk∗j )}
r+δ +λ
l
k
(1.13)

Proposition 1 (The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium reservation strategies ε ∗ )
f

m f
∗
Given {um
i j , ui j , F(.), σ , M(., .), µi j , λ , β , r, δ } and distributions (s , s ), the solution ε to

equation (1.13) exists and is unique.
´∞
σ
σ
∗
∗
r+δ +λ εi∗j [ε − εi j ]dF(ε) = r+δ +λ ϕ(εi j ), and the third equal∂ Z (ε)
ity results from integration by part and the fact that ∂i jε = r+δσ+λ . E[Zi j (ε̃), 0] is also understood as the
expected surplus from marriage i, j, which is E[Zi j (ε̃), 0] = [1 − F(εi∗j )]E[Zi j (ε̃)|ε̃ ≥ εi∗j ], the probability
of acceptance of i, j marriages, (1 − F(εi∗j )), multiplied by the expected surplus conditional on acceptance,
(E[Zi j (ε̃)|ε̃ ≥ εi∗j ]).
22 Note

that E[Zi j (ε̃), 0] =

´∞

εi∗j

Zi j (ε)dF(ε) =
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Proof. Implied by the Banach Fixed-point Theorem. See Appendix 3.1.1.
At the equilibrium, transfers ti j (ε) are made from male i to female j as follows:
ε
f
f
f
m
ui j + σ + ti j (ε) = β (um
(1.14)
i j + ui j + σ ε) + (1 − β )(r + δ )U j − β (r + δ )Ui
2
σ β (1 − β )
1
f
f
ti j (ε) = β um
{∑ αilm ϕ(εil∗ ) − ∑ αk j ϕ(εk∗j )}.
i j − (1 − β )ui j + σ (β − )ε −
2
r+δ +λ l
k
(1.15)
f

Note that the transfer to female j increases in the outside option of female j, U j , and
decreases in the outside option of male i, Uim . As shown in equation(1.15), higher marriage
f

market prospects of wife j summarized in the term, ∑k αk j ϕ(εk∗j ) leads to higher transfers
to her.

Measure of singles
The equilibrium requires that the optimal strategies ε ∗ are consistent with the assumed
distribution of (sm , s f ). Let ηi j denote the steady-state stock of marriages between i type
husbands and j type wives. Then, the inflow to this stock will be the meetings that draw
sm s

f

match qualities that exceed the threshold, given by Mi j [1−F(εi∗j )] = µi j M(Sm , S f ) Sim S jf [1−
F(εi∗j )]. The outflow from the i, j marriages will be ηi j [λ F(εi∗j ) + δ ]; that is, the couples
whose updated match qualities are lower than the threshold, given by ηi j λ F(εi∗j ), plus the
couples who die, given by ηi j δ . Thus, at the steady state where the inflow equals to the
outflow, ηi j is given as follows.

ηi j =

Mi j [1 − F(εi∗j )]
δ

+ λ F(εi∗j )

=

1 − F(εi∗j )
δ

α m sm
+ λ F(εi∗j ) i j i
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=

1 − F(εi∗j )
δ

f f
αi j s j
∗
+ λ F(εi j )

(1.16)

This equilibrium outcomes should be consistent with exogenous distribution of types (gm , g f ),
which leads to the following conditions about the measure of singles (sm , s f ).

m
m
gm
i = si + ∑ ηil = s + ∑
l

l

αilm [1 − F(εil∗ )] m
s
δ + λ F(εil∗ ) i

(1.17)

f

f
gj

f
= sj

+∑

f
ηk j = s j

+∑

k

k

1 + ∑l
f

δ + λ F(εk∗j )

f

(1.18)

sj

gm
i

sm
i =

sj =

αk j [1 − F(εk∗j )]

(1.19)

αilm (sm ,s f )[1−F(εil∗ )]
δ +λ F(εil∗ )
f
gj

(1.20)

f

α (sm ,s f )[1−F(ε ∗ )]
1 + ∑k k j δ +λ F(ε ∗ ) k j
kj

Finally, the marriage market equilibrium {ε ∗ , (sm , s f )} is defined as follows.
f

Definition 1 (Marriage Market Equilibrium) For given primitives {um
i j , ui j , F(.), σ , M(., .),
µi j , λ , β , r, δ } and exogenous distributions (gm , g f ), an equilibrium consists of a pair
{ε ∗ , (sm , s f )} such that
1. given (sm , s f ), reservation match qualities ε ∗ , which characterize individually optimal acceptance strategies, are the unique solution of equation (1.13), and
2. these individuals’ decisions, ε ∗ , produce the same steady-state singles distributions
(sm , s f ) according to equations (1.19),(1.20).
Proposition 2 (The existence of a marriage market equilibrium {ε ∗ , (sm , s f )}) For any
f

m f
primitives {um
i j , ui j , F(.), σ , M(., .), µi j , λ , β , r, δ } and exogenous distributions (g , g ), a

marriage market equilibrium exists.
Proof. Implied by the Brouwer Fixed-point Theorem. See Appendix 3.1.2
Two features of the model, discrete type spaces and match quality shocks, are empirically relevant and simplify theoretical analysis as well. First, cultural types, such as
15

race, ethnicity and religion are indeed discrete. Although some other traits, such as wealth,
are continuous in nature, they may be categorized (e.g. very rich, rich, average, poor, very
poor) when one evaluates the traits of others. With these discrete types, an equilibrium consists of discrete real numbers rather than a set of real functions over continuous domains.
In addition, this specification can incorporate multiple attributes by defining types differently. Unlike previous marriage market models in which marital utilities are defined as a
parametric function of traits of husbands and wives, I adopt non-parametric specification of
preferences for every type of pairs. This feature yields explicit equilibrium conditions and
identification of further parameters (opportunity parameters).23 Lastly, the beauty of love,
approximated by a random draw of match quality ε, is that it grants smoothness (continuity)
to this discrete world.24
Even though the existence of equilibrium is established, the uniqueness of equilibrium is not guaranteed. I accordingly propose an identification technique that is robust to
multiplicity.

1.3

Data

The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID 1968-2011) includes longitudinal information
on individual marriage transitions.25 The study starts in 1968 and includes retrospective
questions on people’s first and most recent marriages that began before 1968. However,
I only use information after 1968, the year in which laws prohibiting interracial marriage
were invalidated.26
23 The

limitation of this approach is that it does not allow for substantial heterogeneity of agents, because
adding one trait increases the number of parameters exponentially and some pairs may have limited number
of observations. I will return to the issue of missing dimensions in the following section.
24 Match specific heterogeneity as a form of random shock has long been employed in the search literature.
See survey papers for the labor market (Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright 2005) and for the marriage market
(Burdett and Coles 1999). See the analysis on existence of equilibrium with a continuum of types and
transferable utility (Shimer and Smith 2000).
25 See details on data construction in Appendix 3.2.
26 Loving v. Virginia (388 U.S. 1 1967) is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1967 which
invalidated laws prohibiting interracial marriages, leading to the repeal of anti-miscegenation laws in 16
Southern states.
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I consider racial/ethnic types (white, black and Hispanic) of individuals for the main
analysis.27 I use information on self-reported race and ethnicity. Regardless of their race, if
individuals report themselves as Hispanic descent in response to the question on ethnicity,
they are categorized as Hispanic. Non-Hispanic others are excluded from the analysis due
to their small sample size.
The following tables document the observed patterns of duration of singlehood and
marriage and transition between the two states.
Table 1.1: Duration of singlehood

male
female

white
8.26
[0.76]
7.33
[0.74]

black
10.83
[0.60]
11.11
[0.51]

Hispanic
8.48
[0.70]
7.48
[0.64]

Notes: Mean duration of all observed singlehood spells in year and fraction of completed spells in brackets.

Table 1.1 shows the mean duration of singlehood including both completed and censored
spells and the fraction of completed spells in brackets. Since observations may face different censoring points, it is not straightforward to directly compare different cells in Table
1.1.28 Despite this limitation, this table shows that blacks seem to wait longer than whites
and Hispanics before they marry in terms both of observed mean durations and fractions of
completed spells.
27W, B, H denote non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic respectively. i j marriage denotes
marriage between i type husband and j type wife with 9 possible combinations.
28 The estimates of the hazard rate of divorce that enable comparison of singlehood durations among types
will be reported in Table 1.7, Section 1.4.
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Table 1.2: Transition from singlehood to marriages

white male
white female
black male
black female
Hispanic male
Hispanic female

spouse type
black
0.008
(45)
0.022
(129)
0.913
(2,051)
0.951
(2,189)
0.048
(81)
0.056
(96)

white
0.948
(5,156)
0.942
(5,441)
0.053
(119)
0.017
(40)
0.167
(283)
0.193
(340)

Hispanic
0.044
(245)
0.036
(216)
0.034
(75)
0.032
(76)
0.784
(1,331)
0.751
(1,311)

Notes: Fraction of marriages with column type spouses in all recorded marriages of row types between 1968-2011. Number of
observations in parentheses.

Table 1.2 presents the transitions to marriage. Its salient feature is the high frequencies of marriages within race. Gender asymmetry exists in marital patterns. There are
more transitions to BW marriages than to W B marriages.29 On the other hand, there are
more transitions to W H marriages than to HW marriages. It should be noted that there are
very few intermarriages between blacks and other groups (e.g., only 85 marriages between
white males and black females). Even though the model itself is flexible to the introduction of several dimensions (e.g., race, religion, education), the paucity of intermarriages in
the data prevents me from doing an analysis with detailed type specifications. Moreover, I
need to pool all observations who may participate in the marriage market in different areas
and times, although I acknowledge that it becomes difficult to defend the assumption of
time-invariant parameters over 40 years.30
29 White

females marry blacks more than white males do and black males marry whites more than black
females do.
30 Missing dimensions may cause problems in estimation regarding two hypotheses: 1) by-product hypothesis: Homogamy in racial dimension may be the by-product of sorting along other dimensions. However, it
is shown by Wong (2003b) that differences in racial identities matter much more (explaining 74% of the low
intermarriage rate) than differences in endowments (wage and education). 2) exchange hypothesis: This hypothesis argues that members of groups whose prestige in society is low would have better chance of marrying
outside their group, if these members offered a high socioeconomic status in return. While mixed evidence
has been reported for the patterns of exchange in interracial marriage (findings summarized by Schwartz
2013), this hypothesis may cause bias if, for example, the stability of W B marriages is not the result of their
racial types but that of other dimensions. To partially address this concern, I estimate hazard rate of divorce
after controlling for other dimensions (education and body mass index of the husband and wife, and the year
of marriage). The main results regarding the relative strength of preferences and opportunities are unaffected.
(Results are available upon request.) However, a thorough analysis with multiple traits can be done with
models in which individual types are newly defined (ex: blacks above and below average education). Differences in preferences and opportunities of the same racial individuals with different endowments would be an
interesting topic of investigation.

18

Table 1.3: Duration of marriages
male\female
white

white
13.43
[0.21]
8.37
[0.20]
8.98
[0.13]

black
Hispanic

black
10.15
[0.13]
11.78
[0.22]
9.52
[0.17]

Hispanic
10.54
[0.18]
11.13
[0.23]
11.62
[0.06]

Notes: Mean duration of all observed marriages in year and fraction of completed
spells in brackets. Each cell represents i j marriage between male type i (in the
row) and female type j (in the column).

Table 1.3 documents the observed mean duration and the fraction of completed durations (marriages ended by divorce) in brackets. As discussed in Table 1.1, direct comparisons cannot be made based on this table due to different fractions of censoring and
different censoring points. Based on the comparisons among the cell with similar fractions of censored spells, it is shown that WW marriages may be more stable than BW , BB,
and BH marriages. Considering that only 6% of their marriages are ended in divorce, HH
marriages also seem to last longer than other marriages.
Table 1.4: Type distribution in population

male
female

white
0.743
0.749

black
0.118
0.134

Hispanic
0.119
0.117

Notes: Measure of each type when the total number of females is normalized to 1. Gender ratio is 0.980.

Lastly, as in Table 1.4, type distributions (gm , g f ) are constructed based on the resident population in 2000 (age 16-64).31
31 Source:

Projections of the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, Population Projections Program (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Including non-Hispanic others (denoted as O), the
fractions of each type in the Census are {W, B, H, O} = {0.709, 0.113, 0.114, 0.045} for males and
{0.712, 0.127, 0.111, 0.049} for females.
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1.4

Identification and Estimation

This section introduces identification techniques for recovering model primitives from observables. The model has the following primitives:
f

preferences um
i j (ui j ): deterministic flow utility from marriage i, j for husband
i (wife j); F(ε): the distribution of match quality; σ : the weight on or dispersion of the stochastic component of marital utility
meeting technology µi j : the bias of meetings between i males and j females
compared to random meeting; M(Sm , S f ): the part in meeting specification that
depends on the total numbers of male and female singles (which will be normalized to be the total number of meetings at the steady state)
other primitives λ : the Poisson arrival rate of new draws of match quality; β : the female bargaining weight; r: the discount rate; δ : the Poisson rate
of death
Assume we have the following data on the environment and outcomes of the marriage
market.
f

type distributions gm
i , g j : the type distribution in male and female populations.
individual marriage histories d0c : duration of singlehood in cycle c; γ0c : 1
j
if the singlehood spell in cycle c is completed and 0 if the spell is censored; 1c :
1 if the type of spouse in cycle c is a type j female; d1c : duration of marriage
in cycle c; γ1c : 1 if the marriage spell in cycle c is completed and 0 if censored.
Parameters that can be identified with given data are preference parameters, ωi j ≡
f
um
i j +ui j

σ

, (the total deterministic part of utilities from i, j marriages evaluated by husband i

and wife j, divided by the dispersion parameter σ ) and opportunity parameters, µi j , (the
bias of meetings between i and j compared to uniformly random encounters). I calibrate
other parameters based on different sources as in Table 1.5. Since those parameters in Table
1.5 affect all types of individuals and marriages at the same time, my main results about
relative differences in preference and opportunity parameters across nine pairings and especially rankings among estimates are overall robust to the choice of calibrated parameters.
20

Even though the choice of λ has different implications on the relative strength of preferences and opportunities, the main results are also robust over the reasonable range of λ .
The discussion on this aspect follows in Appendix 3.3.
Table 1.5: Parameters calibrated
parameter

description

value

source

β
M(Sm , S f )
F(ε)
r
δ

bargaining weight
part of meeting process
match quality distribution
discount rate
death rate

0.50
p
Sm , S f
Φ(ε)
0.04
0.0159

λ

arrival rate of new match
quality shock to couples

0.03

gender symmetry
gender symmetry
standard normal
standard
the average remaining number
of years expected at age 16 32
See Appendix 3.3

Notes: This table describes the baseline values of calibrated parameters and how I set this level to fit related information.

I develop a three-step estimation procedure to recover preference and opportunity
parameters of the marital search model. The first step estimates the hazard rates of transitions, from singlehood to different marriages and from different marriages to singlehood,
using the data on durations to marriages and durations to divorce and how duration spells
are completed. In the second step, I decompose the estimated hazard rates into two parts:
arrival components (arrival rates of meetings) and decision components (acceptance probabilities upon meeting). The last step maps the recovered decision rules and arrival rates
to model parameters, based on the conditions that the marriage market equilibrium should
satisfy.
This sequential identification establishes intuitive one-to-one mappings from observations to model outcomes, and from model outcomes to primitives, which are in the reverse order of the logic of the model. Each stage uses the results of the preceding one in
an explicit manner. Estimation errors are thus computed based on the delta method. One
of the strengths of this method is its robustness to multiplicity of equilibria. Since sorting
externality may cause multiple equilibria, the uniqueness of equilibrium, a one-to-one mapping from primitives to model outcomes, is not guaranteed. However, there is a one-to-one
32 Source:

USA Social Security Administration 2009. male: 60.64 years, female: 65.45. 0.0159 =
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1
63

mapping from realized model outcomes suggested by the data to primitives.

1.4.1

Step 1: estimating hazard rates

This first step estimates a four-state hazard model (single, or married with a white, black,
or Hispanic partner) using maximum likelihood estimation. The hazard rates of marriage
formation and dissolution are recovered from observed patterns of duration and transition.
0f

Let h1i j denote the hazard rate of divorce of marriage i j. Let h0m
i j (hi j ) denote the
hazard rate of transition to marriage i j of male i (female j) from his (her) singlehood.33
The duration of marriage i j, di1j , has the density given by
di1j ∼ h1i j exp{−h1i j di1j }.

(1.21)

The singlehood duration of male i ending in transition to i j marriages, di0m
j follows the
density as follows.34

0m
0m 0m
di0m
j ∼ hi j exp{− ∑ hik di j }

(1.22)

k

Taking into account censoring, the likelihood contribution for a given individual who is
categorized as i type male can be written as
1
k
lim (h0m
ik , hik ∀k; d0c , γ0c , 1c ∀k, d1c , γ1c ) =
0m 1c γ0c
1
1 γ1c 1c
∏ exp{−∑ h0m
ik d0c }[∏(hik ) ] ∏[exp{−hik d1c }(hik ) ] .
k

c

k

k

k

(1.23)

k

Estimated hazard rates of marriage transition and divorce and their standard errors
33 Technically,

the Poisson rate of death, δ , can also be estimated in this step. However, some reports of
one’s death appear inconsistent (indistinguishable from censoring of the data), leading to an unreasonably
low death rate. Thus, recover the death rate directly from other data sources as shown in Table 1.5 and I
ignore observed death when I construct the data on duration and transition. Marriages ended by widowhood
are considered as incomplete.
34 This is the estimation of a competing risks model. Several hazard rates associated with various exits (all
possible marriage types male i may engage) govern the duration of his singlehood.
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are reported in Tables 1.6 and 1.7.
Table 1.6: Estimated hazard rates of marriage

white male
white female
black male
black female
Hispanic male
Hispanic female

white
0.0806 (0.0012)
0.0876 (0.0013)
0.0030 (0.0003)
0.0008 (0.0001)
0.0148 (0.0010)
0.0159 (0.0009)

spouse type
black
0.0007 (0.0001)
0.0022 (0.0002)
0.0452 (0.0011)
0.0392 (0.0009)
0.0039 (0.0005)
0.0041 (0.0005)

Hispanic
0.0038 (0.0003)
0.0038 (0.0003)
0.0018 (0.0002)
0.0015 (0.0002)
0.0565 (0.0019)
0.0545 (0.0017)

Notes: MLE estimates, annual values, standard errors in parentheses. Each cell represents the exit of singles (in
the row) to marriages with different spousal types (in the column).

Table 1.6 presents the estimated hazard rates of marriage formation, h0m , h0f , and
standard errors in parentheses. The estimates show high frequencies of exits to intra-racial
marriage for all types, which are associated with patterns in distributions in marital flows
(Table 1.2). The overall levels of hazard rates are low for black males and females, related
to their long singlehood duration shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.7: Estimated hazard rates of divorce
male\female
white
black
Hispanic

white
0.0154
(0.0003)
0.0236
(0.0034)
0.0145
(0.0018)

black
0.0128
(0.0038)
0.0186
(0.0006)
0.0181
(0.0035)

Hispanic
0.0174
(0.0017)
0.0205
(0.0033)
0.0053
(0.0004)

Notes: MLE estimates, annual values, standard errors in parentheses. Each
cell represents i j marriage between male type i (in the row) and female type
j (in the column).

Table 1.7 presents the estimated hazard rates of marriage dissolution, h1 , and standard errors in parentheses. It first shows the stability of HH marriages while the most
unstable marriages are between black males and white females. Marriages involving white
males are relatively stable. On the other hand, marriages of black males are overall less
persistent, although for black females’ marriages to white males are estimated to be stable.35
35 Bratter

and King (2008) document the similar patterns in marital stability of different pairings based on
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1.4.2

Step 2: recovering model outcomes

In the second step, I recover equilibrium outcomes of the model, arrival rates of different
meetings (marriage opportunities), and decision rules of singles and couples. Note that a
hazard rate of transition has two parts, the arrival component and the decision component.
The hazard rate of divorce of marriage i j, h1i j , is given by the following.
h1i j = λ F(εi∗j )

(1.24)

Given the calibrated value of λ , the rate of updating match quality, F(εi∗j ), the probability
of rejecting marriage i j, is recovered. The crucial identifying assumption is that F(.) and
λ , how match qualities of couples are distributed and evolve, do not depend on types.
Different types experience the same process of stochastic shocks after marriage. Therefore,
differences in observed marriage stability across different type pairings can be attributed to
differences in the time-invariant willingness to accept this type of marriage represented by
F(εi∗j ).36
After recovering the acceptance rules, across-type variation in hazard rates of marthe National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) 2002. They also find the likelihood of divorce is race- and
gender-specific, and the differences among WW , W B, BW marriages are statistically significant. Black-white
marriages were twice (2.26) as likely to result in divorce in 10 years after marriage as white-white couples,
while white-black marriages were less likely (0.67). Considering the patterns in dimensions other than race
(e.g., Blacks who marry whites may be more educated than blacks in BB marriages), they include controls
(age cohort, age at marriage, education of respondent, status of parents’ marriage, status of parents’ marriage when respondent was age 14, age differences between spouses, premarital cohabitation, and premarital
births). The ratio (calculated based on the coefficient on racial dummies) from the adjusted model are 2.09
and 0.56, which are similar to the results without controls. This evidence supports that the differences in
marital stability across racial pairings in Table 1.7 are not systematically affected by small sample bias or by
missing dimensions through the exchange hypothesis.
36 Linking higher marital stability to the higher degree of acceptance of that marriage is one of the most
significant features and major contributions of my model. I will discuss how relaxing of some model assumptions affects this link and the estimated results:
1) First to consider is the type-dependent λ , such as λi j . Some types of couples may update their match
quality more frequently than others. It then becomes impossible to find the degree of acceptance F(εi∗j ) from
the information on marital stability. However, it is likely that interracial marriages have higher λ than samerace marriages, λi j > λii ∀i, j, i 6= j. In this case the rejection probabilities for interracial marriages would be
lower than estimated ones while the rejection probabilities for same-race marriages would be higher. The gap
in acceptance between same-race and interracial marriages would be smaller than what is estimated. Thus,
the role of meetings, which turns out to be a critical factor in racial marital patterns, would be underestimated
rather than overestimated.
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riage transition (variation in singlehood durations and transitions into different marriages)
can be used to identify how frequently singles receive marriage opportunities with different
potential spouses. The hazard rate of marriage i j to male i, h0m
i j is given by
m
∗
h0m
i j = αi j [1 − F(εi j )].

(1.26)

Given that the decision rule, the acceptance probability [1 − F(εi∗j )], is recovered from the
persistence of marriage, the arrival component, αimj is now recovered in equation (1.26).
All information on marital and singlehood durations, and transitions to different marriages,
contributes to the identification of arrival rates. The mean duration of marriage i j is E(di1j )
=

1
h1i j

=

1
λ F(εi∗j )

1
.
∑l αilm [1−F(εil∗ )]

and the mean duration of i’s singlehood is given by E(di0m ) =

1
∑l h0m
il

=

If pm
i j denotes the probability that male i marries female j conditional that he

marries someone, which is given by pm
ij =

h0m
ij
∑l h0m
il

=

∗
αi0m
j [1−F(εi j )]

∑l αil0m [1−F(εil∗ )]

, then rearranging equation

2) Secondly, the distribution of match quality shock F(ε) can also be type-specific, such as Fi j (ε). Different
ε∗

variances σi j prevent us from recovering εi∗j and σi j separately (only Fi j (εi∗j ), and then σiijj can be recovered
under normal distribution.) The equilibrium condition in Equation 1.13 cannot be used to recover marital
utilities (step 3, first part), since equilibrium reservation strategies ε ∗ are now governed by the following
equation.
σi j εi∗j +

λ σi j
1
f
ϕ(εi∗j ) + um
{(1 − β ) ∑ αilm σil ϕ(εil∗ ) + β ∑ αkf j σk j ϕ(εk∗j )}
i j + ui j =
r+δ +λ
r+δ +λ
l
k

(1.25)

Nevertheless, one can still recover opportunity components, arrival rates αimj , αifj (step 2, second part) and
meeting frequency parameters µi j (step 3, second part), only based on recovered Fi j (εi∗j ). However, possible
systematic differences in σ may cause biases in estimation of preference components. Consider the case
where intermarriages draw match quality from a distribution with higher variance, σi j > σii ∀i, j, i 6= j. Cutoffs
for interracial marriages would then be underestimated, whereas cutoffs for same-race marriages would be
overestimated. On the contrary to type-specific λi j , this may lead to the overestimation of the importance of
meeting factors compared to preference factors.
3) Lastly, allowing the standard form of persistency in the evolution of match quality ε (e.g., new match
quality ε 0 is ε 0 = ε0 + υ while υ is drawn from a common distribution and independent of ε0 , the initial
match quality) still preserves the link. It is true that the type of marriage with a higher match quality cutoff
(εi∗j ) has a higher level of match quality draw than other marriages with lower cutoffs on average. However,
what matters in the stability of marriage is not the absolute level of match quality but the distance between
the current match quality draw and the cutoff. Thus, my model says that marriages that survive longer are
f
the ones with high time-invariant utilities, um
i j + ui j , rather than the ones with passionate but possibly fleeting
emotion, ε.
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(1.26) then yields

αimj =

pm
ij

1

E(di0m ) 1 − λ E1(d 1 )

.

(1.27)

ij

Shown in equation (1.27), if the share of i j marriage in all marriage of male i is small (low
1
pm
i j ), regardless of the stability of i j marriages (high E(di j )), this pattern is explained by the

infrequent arrivals of i j meetings (low αimj ). In addition, if he stays single for a long period
of time (high E(di0m
j )), this also lowers his overall arrival rates.
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 document the results from this second step.
Table 1.8: Estimated rejection probabilities
male\female
white
black
Hispanic

white
0.513
(0.011)
0.787
(0.112)
0.483
(0.060)

black
0.426
(0.128)
0.621
(0.020)
0.602
(0.116)

Hispanic
0.579
(0.056)
0.683
(0.109)
0.176
(0.014)

Notes: Estimated rejection probability of marriage upon meeting or upon updating of match quality, F(εi∗j ), for male i as a row player and female j as a column
player. Continuous mapping from MLE estimates. Standard errors in parentheses, computed based on the delta method.

Table 1.8 shows the rejection probability of each meeting based on a one-to-one mapping
from the estimated hazard rate of divorce as documented in Table 1.7. The lowest rejection
probability (or the highest acceptance probability) is found in Hispanic intra-marraiges,
which is linked to observations in marital stability.
Table 1.9: Estimated arrival rates

white male
white female
black male
black female
Hispanic male
Hispanic female

white
0.1654 (0.0045)
0.1797 (0.0048)
0.0139 (0.0076)
0.0014 (0.0004)
0.0286 (0.0038)
0.0377 (0.0055)
f

spouse type
black
0.0012 (0.0003)
0.0104 (0.0057)
0.1193 (0.0071)
0.1033 (0.0060)
0.0097 (0.0031)
0.0131 (0.0048)

Hispanic
0.0090 (0.0014)
0.0074 (0.0010)
0.0055 (0.0020)
0.0037 (0.0012)
0.0686 (0.0025)
0.0662 (0.0024)

Notes: Estimated arrival rate of each meeting, αimj (αi j ), for male i (female j) with column type females ∀ j (∀i).
Continuous mapping from MLE estimates. Standard errors in parentheses, computed based on the delta method.
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Table 1.9 shows the recovered arrival rates. Since the differences in acceptance probabilities are not substantial, these arrival rates mimic the hazard rates of marriage formation
in Table 1.6 and are characterized by high arrival rates of intra-racial meetings. It has
been shown that some intramarriages (e.g.,W B marriages) are stable despite their low frequencies. This further lowers inferred arrivals of these types of meetings. In addition, the
arrival rates of meetings between non-Hispanics and Hispanics are higher than the rates for
meetings between blacks and whites.

1.4.3

Step 3: recovering model parameters

Using the recovered decision rules and arrival rates, the last step employs the equilibrium
condition to identify underlying parameters. Note first that what is recovered in the second
step is reduced-form parameters that depend on equilibrium outcomes, instead of structural
parameters that are invariant to environment. The counterfactual experiments can be done
after finding the structural parameters that govern underlying preferences and restrictions
on individuals’ decision making.37
First, I use the condition for optimal threshold, ε ∗ , to identify underlying preferences.
As stated in Section 1.2, equation (1.13), the optimal stopping rules are determined at the
point where two individuals are indifferent between being single and being married with
the threshold match quality.
f

um
i j + ui j
σ

37 For

+ εi∗j +

λ ϕ(εi∗j )

r+δ m r+δ f
Ui +
Uj
r+δ +λ
σ
σ
(1 − β ) ∑l αilm ϕ(εil∗ )
r+δ m
Ui =
σ
r+δ +λ
f
β ∑k αk j ϕ(εk∗j )
r+δ f
Uj =
σ
r+δ +λ
=

(1.28)
(1.29)
(1.30)

example, the acceptance rules represented by εi∗j (often recovered by revealed preference argument

based on choice-set data) involve values in marriage Uimj +Uifj and values in singlehood Uim +U jf , which are
equilibrium objects.
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I first recover the outside option of each type,

r+δ m r+δ f
σ Ui , σ U j

lifetime value of being single of male type i in flow utility term,

∀i, j. The discounted

r+δ m
σ Ui ,

is related to his

marital prospects. These marital prospects include two factors: first, how frequently he gets
marriage opportunities, αimj ∀ j; and second, how much expected utility he gets from each
marriage, ϕ(εi∗j ) ∀ j.38
At the threshold match quality, εi∗j , the utility of being married with this match quality
(the left hand side of equation (1.28)) should be equal to the utility of staying single (the
right hand side of equation (1.28)). This leads to the identification of marriage utilities
f

between male i and female j, ωi j ≡

um
i j +ui j
σ .

This exercise shows that high marital utility

(high ωi j ) is related to two factors: 1) the stability of this type of marriage (high εi∗j ), and 2)
f

male i and female j’s high outside options (high Uim ,U j ) that are affected by preferences
and opportunities of all marriages that male i and female j may engage in.
Next, I use the conditions for steady states and gender consistency in meetings to
identify opportunity parameters that govern the meeting process, µi j . Recall the specification of meetings between i and j, Mi j , and their relationship with arrival rates.
f
√
sj
sm
f f
i
m
f
Mi j = µi j S S m f = αimj sm
i = αi j s j
S S

(1.31)

f

Given the steady state conditions, the measure of singles, sm
i , s j , are recovered from esti´∞
that ϕ(εi∗j ) = r+δσ+λ E max[Zi j (ε̃), 0] = εi j [1 − F(εi j )], thus ϕ(εi∗j ) measures the expected marital
surplus evaluated before match quality is realized. Given recovered εi∗j and the assumption on the functional
form of F(.), ϕ(εi∗j ) is recovered.
38 Recall
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0f

mated hazard rates, h1i j ,h0m
i j and hi j , as follows:
sm
i =

39

gm
i
α m [1−F(ε ∗ )]
1 + ∑l δil +λ F(ε ∗il)
il
f

f
sj

=

gj
f

α [1−F(ε ∗ )]
1 + ∑k δk j+λ F(ε ∗k )j
kj

=

gm
i

(1.32)

h0m
il
1 + ∑l δ +h
1
il
f
gj

=

(1.33)

0f

1 + ∑k

hk j

δ +h1k j

f

By plugging these into equation (1.31), I can find µ̂imj , µ̂i j to fit the estimated arrival rates
f

(αimj , αi j , from Step 2). Note that the value obtained from the male side can be different
from the value obtained from the female side.40 To find one µ̂i j , I efficiently combine these
two pieces of information based on the minimum distance estimation as follows where V̂
denotes the estimated variance of estimators.
f

µ̂i j =

µ̂imj

V̂ (µ̂i j )

f

f

V̂ (µ̂imj ) + V̂ (µ̂i j )

+ µ̂i j

V̂ (µ̂imj )
f

V̂ (µ̂imj ) + V̂ (µ̂i j )

(1.34)

The results, the estimated preference and opportunity parameters, ωi j , µi j , from this last
step will be presented in the subsequent section.
39 The

comparison of the fraction of singles with the data counterpart will be presented in Section 1.5. My
model can fit these untargetted measures.
40 The reason is that the samples do not contain all agents in the marriage market. In addition, observations
are from different periods of time.
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1.5

Results

1.5.1

Estimated parameters
Table 1.10: Estimated marital preferences
male\female

white

black

Hispanic

r+δ f
m
[ r+δ
σ Ui ] \ [ σ U j ]

[0.427]

[0.169]

[0.478]

white

0.650
(0.034)
-0.212
(0.363)
0.818
(0.131)

0.571
(0.263)
-0.032
(0.055)
0.307
(0.263)

0.562
(0.129)
0.130
(0.277)
1.547
(0.063)

[0.389]

black
[0.200]

Hispanic
[0.496]

um +u

f

Notes: Estimated preferences of marriage i j, ωi j = i j σ i j , between male i (row
player) and female j (column player). The value of being single of each type in flow
m r+δ f
terms, r+δ
σ Ui , σ U j , at the margin. Continuous mapping from MLE estimates, standard errors in parentheses computed based on the delta method.

In Table 1.10, the number at the margin is the value of being single for each type,
r+δ f
σ Uj ,

r+δ m
σ Ui ,

that represents marital prospects. Due to both their stable marriages and frequent

arrivals of HH marriage opportunities, it is estimated that Hispanic males and females have
the highest marital prospects and black males and females have the lowest.41
f

Each cell in Table 1.10 presents the estimated marital preference, ωi j =

um
i j +ui j
σ ,

the

aggregate gains from i j marriage evaluated by i husband and j wife apart from match quality.42 Comparisons across different marriage types find that the marital utilities associated
with white males are high overall, whereas the marital utilities associated with black males
m is high for a certain female
are generally low. Two channels may explain this. First, uW
j
f

j; white males get high utilities from marriage with wife j. Second, uW j is high for a certain j; white males are desirable spouses for their wives of type j. Since I cannot separate
f

um
i j and ui j without information on intra-household transfers, it is impossible to distinguish
41 Under the normalization of singlehood flow utilities to zero, this value of being a different type captures
only marital prospects. The value of being a different race in other aspects (e.g., labor market prospects)
cannot be measured in my setting.
42 Even though some values of deterministic components of utility are negative, due to the existence of the
idiosyncratic ´component (match quality), expected marital surpluses of all marriage types are positive. Note
∞
that ϕ(ε ∗ ) = ε ∗ [1 − F(ε)]dε > 0 for all −∞ < ε ∗ < ∞.
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between the two explanations.43
f

Due to this inseparability of utilities, um
i j + ui j , preferences for the same-race marriages cannot be tested according to individual perspectives (for example, whether um
ii >
um
i j ∀ j 6= i holds for male i). However, I can still compare two homogamous marriages with
two intermarriages and see, for example, whether ωWW + ωHH > ωW H + ωHW holds. If
this inequality holds, two groups may generate more marital utilities by segregating instead
of mixing, even though this does not guarantee that all four individuals involved prefer
the same-type spouses. These inequalities are statistically significant between whites and
Hispanics (p-value: 0.000), and between blacks and Hispanics (p-value: 0.005), but not
between whites and blacks (p-value: 0.56).
By comparing utilities of different homogamous marriages, I find ωHH > ωWW (pvalue: 0.000) and ωWW > ωBB (p-value: 0.000). Hispanic couples value marriage more
than white couples, whereas black couples value it less. Lastly, some intermarriages show
gender asymmetry in their utility levels, ωW B > ωBW (p-value: 0.08), whereas these inequalities are not significant for the rest of the pairs, ωW H ' ωHW (p-value: 0.16), ωBH '
ωHB (p-value: 0.64).
Table 1.11: Estimated marital opportunities
male\female
white
black
Hispanic

white
1.504
(0.029)
0.150
(0.127)
0.305
(0.043)

black
0.014
(0.006)
3.452
(0.175)
0.245
(0.075)

Hispanic
0.375
(0.059)
0.376
(0.138)
4.074
(0.173)

Notes: Estimated opportunities of marriage i j, µ̃i j , between male i (row player)
and female j (column player), illustrating the bias from random matching, µ̃i j =
sm

s

f

(estimated measure of i j meetings)/ (total meetings × Sim × S jf ). Estimates are
obtained based on the minimum distance estimation.

Table 1.11 shows the estimated marital opportunities, where the Poisson parameter
43 See

Appendix 3.4 on the separate identification of husbands’ and wives’ utilities upon availability of
transfer data.
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that governs the frequency of i j meetings is specified as follows:
f
f
√
√
sj
sj
sm
sm
i
i
m
f
m
f
Mi j = µi j S S m f = µ̃i j µ̄ S S m f .
S S
S S

(1.35)

I further separate µi j into two parts, µ̃i j and µ̄. µ̄, a common part for all µi j , is normalized
√
so that µ̄ Sm S f = ∑i, j Mi j (total meetings).44 Upon this normalization, the pair-specific
part µ̃i j now represents the bias from random matching, since this is the ratio between
the estimated measure of i j meetings (Mi j ) and the measure of i j meetings implied by the
sm

s

f

uniform random process (total meetings × Sim × S jf ).
Results show that there are more same-race meetings implied by the uniform random
process, and fewer interracial meetings. The bias toward meetings among Hispanics is the
highest, and WW the lowest. This helps minorities increase the likelihood of within-group
meetings, which would be rare under a random process due to their small population shares.
Regardless of this effect, however, the arrival rates, taking into account the shares in the
population, are favorable for majority groups, αWW > αBB > αHH (Table 1.9). Gender
asymmetry is found but is statistically insignificant.45

1.5.2

Model fit

With the estimated parameters, I can solve the equilibrium.46 The patterns predicted by the
model mimic those observed in the data, suggesting that the model is properly specified.
44 µ̄

is estimated to be 0.164 with standard error 0.004.
µBW ' µW B (p-value: 0.28), µW H ' µHW (p-value: 0.34), and µBH ' µHB (p-value: 0.41). However, it
is shown in Table 1.10 that preference components are unable to drive gender asymmetry in marital patterns.
(e.g., more BW than W B marriages are observed but utilities from W B marriages are higher than those from
BW marriages.) One can conclude that meetings, not preferences, primary cause gender asymmetric marital
patterns.
46 Solving for equilibrium {ε ∗ , (sm , s f )} given parameters is finding a fixed-point. I begin t th iteration
with type distributions among singles (sm t , s f t ). Given these type distributions and thus arrival rates, optimal
thresholds ε t∗ are obtained by solving equations (1.13). Based on equations (1.19) and (1.20), I can update the
type distributions (sm t+1 , s f t+1 ) and continue this procedure until convergence is achieved. I always obtain
the same equilibrium outcome regardless of the choice of initial guesses.
45
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Table 1.12: Model fit: hazard rates of marriage formation

W
white male
0.0853
white female
0.0845
black male
0.0037
black female
0.0009
Hispanic male
0.0185
Hispanic female 0.0178

Model
B
0.0003
0.0009
0.0490
0.0353
0.0037
0.0032

H
0.0026
0.0026
0.0019
0.0016
0.0553
0.0542

W
0.0806
0.0876
0.0030
0.0008
0.0148
0.0159

Data
B
0.0007
0.0022
0.0452
0.0392
0.0039
0.0041

H
0.0038
0.0038
0.0018
0.0015
0.0565
0.0545

Notes: Each cell represents the hazard rate of marriage formation for the type in the row. The column represents the type of spouses (W:white, B:black, H:Hispanic). Model: model predicted hazard rates given estimated parameters. Data: MLE estimates of hazard rates from Step 1 (Table 1.6).

Table 1.13: Model fit: hazard rates of divorce
Model
male\female
W
B
H
white
0.0153 0.0128 0.0176
black
0.0236 0.0187 0.0207
Hispanic
0.0143 0.0180 0.0054

Data
W
B
H
0.0154 0.0128 0.0174
0.0236 0.0186 0.0205
0.0145 0.0181 0.0053

Notes: Each cell represents the hazard rate of divorce. Husband types are in the row and wife types
(W:white, B:black, H:Hispanic) are in the column. Model: model predicted hazard rates given estimated parameters. Data: MLE estimates of hazard rates from Step 1 (Table 1.6).

Tables 1.12 and 1.13 compare the fitted hazard rates given estimated parameters
(baseline hazard rates) with the observed hazard rates that are estimated in Step 1. The
baseline model fits the estimated hazard rates and thus marital transition patterns in the
data.
Table 1.14: Model fit: distribution of marriage flows

white male
white female
black male
black female
Hispanic male
Hispanic female

W
0.967
0.961
0.068
0.024
0.239
0.237

Model
B
0.003
0.010
0.897
0.934
0.048
0.042

H
0.029
0.030
0.035
0.042
0.714
0.721

W
0.948
0.942
0.053
0.017
0.167
0.193

Data
B
0.008
0.022
0.913
0.951
0.048
0.056

H
0.044
0.036
0.034
0.032
0.784
0.751

Notes: Fraction of marriages with column type spouses (W:white, B:black, H:Hispanic) among all marriage
flows of row types in a given period. Model: fraction in flows at a fixed time period. Data: fraction in all
marriages of sample individuals ever recorded.
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Table 1.15: Model fit: distribution of marriage and single stocks
Model
white male
white female
black male
black female
Hispanic male
Hispanic female

W
0.716
0.710
0.037
0.015
0.142
0.128

B
0.003
0.006
0.553
0.487
0.025
0.021

H
0.020
0.023
0.021
0.022
0.602
0.612

Data
S
0.261
0.262
0.390
0.476
0.231
0.240

W
0.723
0.704
0.032
0.011
0.119
0.127

B
0.007
0.018
0.545
0.464
0.035
0.035

H
0.034
0.032
0.019
0.018
0.601
0.560

S
0.236
0.247
0.404
0.507
0.245
0.279

Notes: Fraction in each state: being married to column type spouses (W:white, B:black, H:Hispanic), or being single (S:single).
Model: at the steady state. Data: when the last information is collected.

Table 1.14 presents the matching outcomes in flows of consummated marriages at
a given period of time. The values are related to the hazard rates of marriage formation
(Table 1.12), thus indirectly used for my estimation. Table 1.15 presents the fraction of
each type in different states at the steady state.47 Even though I do not use this information
(distributions of marriages and singles) for my estimation, the observed data are similar to
the model predictions. Given the fact that these model predictions of type distribution on
stocks are based on model specifications (steady-state conditions and description of hazard
rates), I can conclude that the model is sufficiently well specified and reasonably estimated
enough to be used for counterfactual analyses.48

1.5.3

Same-race biases in acceptances and meetings

Several analyses with the baseline model show biases in acceptances and meetings that
potentially lead to racial homogamy.
47 The

data present the last-observed status of sample individuals.
discrepancies in Tables 1.12, 1.14 and 1.15 are caused by gender consistency restrictions of the
model, where I get µi j from male side estimates, µimj , and from female side estimates, µifj . For example, if I use
male side information only, the fit for white males’ exit to W H marriages improves, but the Hispanic females’
exit to W H marriages worsens. If I use female side information, the opposite holds. This inconsistency is
attributable to the pooling of all samples that may participate in different marriage markets during different
time periods.
48 Some
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Table 1.16: Same-race biases in acceptances
probability of acceptance
intrainterratio
meeting meeting
( inter
intra )
white male
white female
black male
black female
Hispanic male
Hispanic female
Total

0.491
0.491
0.378
0.378
0.822
0.822
0.489

0.427
0.385
0.240
0.451
0.499
0.394
0.395

0.870
0.784
0.635
1.194
0.608
0.480
0.808

Notes: Probabilities of accepting intra- and inter- meetings and their ratios are
presented.

The first two columns in Table 1.16 present the probability of accepting intraracial
and interracial meetings. Except for black females, individuals accept (and are accepted at)
same-race meetings more easily than meetings across racial borders. Overall, the acceptance rate of interracial meetings is 80.8% of the acceptance rate of same-race meetings,
indicating the same-race preferences in accepting behaviors. These ratios are the lowest
among Hispanics, indicating that the same-race preferences are highest for Hispanics.
Table 1.17: Same-race biases in meetings

white male
white female
black male
black female
Hispanic male
Hispanic female
Total

fraction of inter-meetings
baseline shuffled
index
0.037
0.214
0.826
0.050
0.224
0.778
0.154
0.860
0.821
0.056
0.844
0.934
0.398
0.926
0.571
0.446
0.932
0.522
0.080
0.363
0.780

Notes: The fractions of inter-meetings in the baseline model and in the uniformly random process are presented. The third column (segregation index)
measures (shuffled-baseline)/(shuffled).

The first column of Table 1.17 documents the fraction of interracial meetings among
all meetings for each type. Among all meetings of white males, only 3.7% of them are interracial (meetings with a black or Hispanic potential spouse), whereas the share of blacks
and Hispanics is 21.4% among female singles in the marriage market. This gap is summa35

rized as a homogamy index of 0.826 in the third column.49 This index summarizes how
the current rate of intermeeting is far from the rate under random meeting, which is also
connected to the odd ratio (1-homogamy index). White males are 0.174(= 1−0.826) times
less likely to meet outside their race then they would under random meeting. It also shows
that the meeting opportunities of Hispanics are close to the racial mix of the marriage market. The opportunities for black females tend toward same-race meetings. Overall, only
8.0% of all meetings are interracial, whereas 36.3% is expected under a uniformly random
process.50 There is a great distance between the current meeting distribution and the shuffled distribution, with a homogamy index of 0.78. People are 0.22 times less likely to meet
across their racial boundaries than they would under uniformly random meeting.
Table 1.18: Same-race biases in marriage stocks

white male
white female
black male
black female
Hispanic male
Hispanic female
Total

fraction of inter-marriages
baseline shuffled
index
0.031
0.224
0.862
0.038
0.230
0.833
0.094
0.901
0.896
0.072
0.899
0.920
0.217
0.875
0.752
0.195
0.872
0.776
0.061
0.376
0.837

Notes: The fractions of inter-marriages in the baseline model and in uniformly
random process are presented.The third column (homogamy index) measures
(shuffled-baseline)/(shuffled).

Table 1.18 shows the distribution of marriage stocks and how it differs from uniformly random matching. Since marriages are meetings that are accepted, the marriage
distribution in Table 1.18 summarizes the features of acceptance behaviors (Table 1.16) and
49 For

example, for white males, the homogamy index is computed as (0.214 − 0.037)/0.214. This index
is also known as the homophily index suggested by Coleman (1959) and used also by Currarini, Jackson,
m
m
m
m
m
and Pin (2010): homogamy indexm
i = ((1 − sharei ) − (1 − intrai ))/(1 − sharei ) = (intrai − sharei )/(1 −
m
sharei ). An index of 0 indicates that this individual’s meeting (or marriage) is distributed according to the
racial mix of the market, whereas an index of 1 indicates that this individual only meets (or marries) a spouse
of his or her own race (perfect segregation). One minus this index gives the odd ratio of intermarriage,
m
m
1 − homogamy indexm
i = (1 − intrai )/(1 − sharei ).
50 Shuffled distributions are specific to initial distributions. Given an initial distribution, take the total
number of meetings and the share of each male and female type. Then, the meeting between i, j in the
f
shuffled distribution is calculated by ‘shuffled meetingi j = total meetings × sharem
i × share j .’
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of meeting opportunities (Table 1.17). In addition, how long marriage lasts contributes to
the measure of steady-state stock of a certain marriage type. Because singles accept intrameetings more easily than inter-meetings and same-race marriages are on average more
stable than interracial marriages, the degree of segregation increases to 0.837 compared to
the homogamy index in meetings (0.780 in Table 1.17). Only 6.1% of all marriages are
interracial, which is above 37.6%, the level expected in random matching.51

1.5.4

Decomposition: preferences vs. opportunities

In this subsection, I decompose the role of opportunities and preferences in explaining
racial homogamy. It should first be reiterated that the findings of this exercise depend on
the assumption that preferences and opportunities are taken as initial conditions to individuals in the marriage market.52 If there are interactions between preferences and opportunities, for example, if meetings are affected by mate preferences (if preferences are shaped
by meetings), the following counterfactual analysis that does not capture this channel may
underestimate the role of preferences (opportunities). My model has the limitation of treating meetings and preferences as essentially exogenous, its advantage being its ability to
identify and quantify the separate role of each channel.
The following arguments may validate the assumption that intraracial and interracial
meeting opportunities can be predetermined to each individual in the marriage market,
which justifies the proceeding counterfactual analysis to quantify the role of each channel
in shaping marital outcomes.
1. Residential and school segregation: In 2000, the median black lived in a neighborhood that was 52 percent black (Easterly 2009). In 2001, 80% of Latino students and
51 These

numbers also fit the data. In the observed data as given in Table 1.15, the intermarriage rate is
given by 7.9%, where 40.2% is expected under uniformly random matching, which leads to the homogamy
index of 0.803.
52 The parameter estimates given in Tables 1.10 and 1.11 are correctly estimated under the less restrictive
assumption that meetings and preferences are determined before individuals play in the marriage market
where they respond to presented opportunities by rejecting or accepting.
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74% of black students attended schools where whites were not the majority. 43% of
Latinos and 38% of blacks attended intensely segregated schools (less than 10% of
whites students) across the nation (Orfield, Kuscera, and Siegel-Hawley 2012). Since
the area where individuals reside and the school which individuals attend are mainly
determined by their parents, their earlier year experiences with intense intraracial
contacts in neighborhood and schools are exogenous to young adults. This may have
continual effects on their networks – whom they get along with and whom they meet
as potential spouses.
2. Institutional settings and the role of third parties: Laumann et al. (2000) document that 23%, 15%, 10%, 8%, and 4% of surveyed married couples met partners
at school, work, private parties, church, and gym/social clubs respectively. These
institutional/preselected meeting settings account for a sizable portion (60%) of the
places where partners have met. These researchers argue that meetings occur frequently in work and school because of the ubiquity of these in people’s lives. This
also shows that gatherings occur and draw people to them for many reasons other than
meeting potential partners, including religious worship, sharing common interests,
and enjoying the experience of being in a group. The same study also shows that 66%
percent of all marriages involved an introduction by some third party (e.g.,family
members, friends, coworkers and classmates). This also indicates the importance of
a person’s social network in determining his or her set of potential partners.53
3. Role of randomness: Anecdotal evidence witnesses the role of randomness (God,
Cupid, karma, serendipity, or whatever it is called) in the beginning and development
of romantic relationship. Unintended circumstances often bind one and his and her
53 This finding is based on a 1992 nationwide survey of 3432 American men and women between the ages
of 18 and 59. Some may argue that singles may control their choice sets especially in special settings such
as online dating sites. For example, users of those sites may begin search by sorting potential partners based
on their races. However, according to more recent analysis by Cacioppoa et al. (2013) (an online survey with
voluntary nature of sampling), only 15.7% of those married between 2005 and 2012 met on online dating
sites. Even in this survey population, meetings at offline preselected settings (work, friend, school, family,
place of worship, social gathering, grew up together, and blind date) still account for 53.7%.
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spouse together.
I conduct counterfactual experiments by solving the model with hypothetical parameters (no differences in opportunities, no differences in preferences). Hypothetical parameters are set to keep the number of total marriages constant.
Table 1.19: Experiment: eliminating opportunity differences
w/o opportunity differences
W
B
H
S
index
white male
0.572 0.101 0.071 0.258 0.076
white female
0.567 0.059 0.087 0.287 0.088
black male
0.373 0.100 0.091 0.436 0.054
black female
0.562 0.088 0.045 0.305 0.037
Hispanic male
0.545 0.051 0.183 0.221 0.131
Hispanic female 0.450 0.092 0.186 0.272 0.145
Total
(inter marriage=35.6%) 0.087

baseline
W
B
H
S
0.716 0.003 0.020 0.261
0.710 0.006 0.023 0.262
0.037 0.553 0.021 0.390
0.015 0.487 0.022 0.476
0.142 0.025 0.602 0.231
0.128 0.021 0.612 0.240
(inter marriage=6.1%)

index
0.862
0.833
0.896
0.920
0.752
0.776
0.837

Notes: Predicted type distribution in steady-state stocks. Fraction in each state: being married to column type spouses (W:white,
B:black, H:Hispanic), or being single (S:single). Without opportunity differences: model outcomes with type-independent (hypothetical) opportunity parameters and estimated preference parameters. Baseline: model outcomes with estimated opportunity and preference
parameters.

Table 1.19 shows that without differences in opportunities, there are substantial increases in interracial marriages. For instance, 37% of black males marry white females as
opposed to 4% in the baseline model. Even under random meetings, Hispanics, who exhibit
the strongest same-race preferences, selectively accept intraracial meetings, resulting in the
highest homogamy index among all groups. Overall, 35.6% of marriages are across races,
which is very close to the 39.0%, that is implied by random matching.54 The homogamy
index decreases to 0.087.
These outcomes from counterfactual experiment with hypothetical, type-independent
meeting opportunities are compared to the findings from randomized controlled meetings
(speed-dating experiments) by Fisman et al. (2008). In their experiments, subjects meet
a number of potential mates for four minutes each, and have the opportunity to accept or
reject each partner. In these speed dating experiments, 47% of all matches are interracial,
54 This

number, the rate of intermarriages in the random matching process, varies across experiments, since
the proportion of singles in each type is changed upon different counterfactual experiments.
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which is comparable to the 53% that would be expected under random matching. The implied homogamy index is (0.53−0.47)/0.53 = 0.113, which is below the index in observed
marriages (0.837) and is closer to my first counterfactual experiment without meeting differences (0.087). Both results show that under random meeting, there would be more intermatches. These similar findings may validate my model assumptions for identification,
confirming the importance of meeting differences in mating outcomes of individuals.
Table 1.20: Experiment: eliminating preference differences
w/o preference differences
W
B
H
S
index
white male
0.699 0.002 0.033 0.266 0.792
white female
0.693 0.012 0.029 0.266 0.762
black male
0.073 0.610 0.035 0.280 0.827
black female
0.013 0.537 0.046 0.405 0.889
Hispanic male
0.183 0.052 0.455 0.310 0.616
Hispanic female 0.206 0.036 0.463 0.295 0.612
Total
(inter marriage=9.38%) 0.755

baseline
W
B
H
S
0.716 0.003 0.020 0.261
0.710 0.006 0.023 0.262
0.037 0.553 0.021 0.390
0.015 0.487 0.022 0.476
0.142 0.025 0.602 0.231
0.128 0.021 0.612 0.240
(inter marriage=6.1%)

index
0.862
0.833
0.896
0.920
0.752
0.776
0.837

Notes: Predicted type distribution in steady-state stocks. Fraction in each state: being married to column type spouses (W:white,
B:black, H:Hispanic), or being single (S:single). Without preference differences: model outcomes with type-independent (hypothetical) preference parameters and estimated opportunity parameters. Baseline: model outcomes with estimated preference and opportunity
parameters.

With the current differences in meeting and without differences in preferences, the
change in intermarriages is limited as shown in Table 1.20. Even in the absence of samerace preferences, only 9.4% of marriages are across races due to significantly frequent
meeting opportunities within racial groups as shown in Table 1.17. This predicted rate of
intermarriage is still far less than the case with random matching, 38.2%. The homogamy
index decreases slightly to 0.755 from the baseline case of 0.837.55
55 Learning match quality is one of the characteristics of meeting and it may take time (e.g., several dates).
This may suggest that the second experiment may underestimate the role of preferences by neglecting the
channel that preferences have impacts on meetings. In this case, the role of preferences compared to meetings
in Table 1.21 may be considered as a lower bound. Despite this possible limitation, the results from the
first experiment alone can validate that much of observed differences in marital behavior is attributed to
differences in meetings. In addition, the anatomy of preferences and availability (more exogenous force in
meeting) can be done only by analyzing how meetings occur and develop, which may be difficult to observe.
The interplay between preferences and availability may further complicate the decomposition. I contribute
the literature of the marriage market by first incorporating the exogenous and type-specific restrictions in
marital opportunities, compared to previous work that assumes ‘whom to choose’ is under compete control
of agents or is identically given to all individuals.
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Table 1.21: Role of opportunity differences

male
female
total

white
0.918
0.913
0.916

black
0.925
0.966
0.946

Hispanic
0.820
0.794
0.807

0.901

Notes: The share in a homogamy index explained by differences in meetings as opposed
to differences in preferences.

In sum, I find that the high probabilites for individuals marrying within their racial
groups are primarily attributable to high incidences of intraracial meetings rather than
same-race preferences. In terms of a homogamy index, overall 90.1% of racial homogamy
is explained by opportunity differences.56 Therefore, my finding concludes that marital
outcomes of individuals hugely depend on whom they meet rather than whom they prefer.
Across races, the opportunity differences explain 91.8%, 92.5% and 82.0% of the homogamy behavior of white, black, and Hispanic males respectively and are 91.3%, 96.6%,
and 79.4% for female counterparts. Opportunities play the greatest role in marital patterns
of black females. In contrast, preferences play a greater role in Hispanic marital outcomes
as opposed to those of whites and blacks.

1.5.5

Predictions upon demographic changes

The marriage market model that I develop can provide a better understanding of how marital patterns respond to demographic changes. I first consider the relationship between an
unbalanced gender ratio for blacks and the high rate of being single for black females,
which is potentially related to the high rate of unmarried births.57
56 The

number is calculated by 0.901 = (0.837 − 0.087)/(0.837 − 0.087 + 0.837 − 0.755).
2010, 40.8 % of all births were to unmarried women. These proportions were 29% for whites, 53%
for Hispanics and 73% for black births. Source: National Vital Statistics Reports, 2012 (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services)
57 In
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Table 1.22: Experiment: balanced gender ratio for blacks
balanced black gender ratio
W
B
H
S
index
white male
0.715 0.003 0.020 0.263 0.868
white female
0.709 0.007 0.023 0.261 0.830
black male
0.039 0.529 0.022 0.410 0.885
black female
0.014 0.525 0.020 0.441 0.932
Hispanic male
0.143 0.023 0.601 0.234 0.753
Hispanic female 0.126 0.025 0.611 0.238 0.773
Total
(inter marriage=6.2%)
0.839

baseline
W
B
H
S
0.716 0.003 0.020 0.261
0.710 0.006 0.023 0.262
0.037 0.553 0.021 0.390
0.015 0.487 0.022 0.476
0.142 0.025 0.602 0.231
0.128 0.021 0.612 0.240
(inter marriage=6.1%)

index
0.862
0.833
0.896
0.920
0.752
0.776
0.837

Notes: Predicted type distribution in steady-state stocks. Fraction in each state: being married to column type spouses (W:white, B:black,
H:Hispanic), or being single (S:single). Balanced black gender ratio: model outcomes under the increased measure of black males from
the type distribution in 2000. Baseline: model outcomes under the type distribution of resident population in 2000.

The third experiment examines that the hypothetical population distribution with the
balanced gender ratio of blacks. The gender ratio of blacks in the baseline model is 0.881.
I replace this gender ratio with the white counterpart (0.992) by increasing the number
of black males.58 The results from the model with the new population distributions are
documented in Table 1.22. Since the marriage market is segregated with low occurrence of
interracial meetings, the change in black males has negligible effects on marital patterns of
other races. What is noteworthy is the increase in the marriage rate of black females, from
52.4% to 55.9% by 6.6%. This result indicates that the high rate of black female singles is
attributable to the imbalanced gender ratio for blacks. However, compared to white females
with the marriage rate of (73.9%), black females still marry less (only 16.0% of white-black
gap in marriage rate has diminished.)
Since the distribution I use is fractions among all residents, I cannot deal with the
critical issue of high incarceration rates of black males.59 If people in prisons and jails
are excluded from the marriage market, the distribution of this non-institutional population
becomes {W, B, H} = {0.750, 0.133, 0.117}, {0.737, 0.110, 0.116} for males and females
58 New population distribution becomes {W, B, H} = {0.742, 0.131, 0.117}, {0.751, 0.133, 0.116} for
males and females.
59 What is only captured in resident populations is higher mortality rates of black males. Meanwhile, an
estimated 11.8% of black males in their twenties and early thirties (20-34) were in prison or jail in 2000,
compared to 1.7% and 3.4% of males for white and Hispanic counterparts. For females aged 20-34, the
fraction of inmates in population is {0.18%, 0.98%, 0.28%} for whites, blacks and Hispanics. (Source: Prison
and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2000, U.S. Department of Justice)
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with gender ratio for each group {0.983, 0.827, 0.992}. If I conduct analyses based with the
non-institutional population, the balanced gender ratio increases the marriage rate of black
females from 50.7% to 55.7% by 10.0%. However, the increased marriage rate is still
below the marriage rate for white females (73.4%). More balanced gender ratio among
blacks decreases white-black marriage rate gap only by 22.0%.60
A greater increase of marriage rate for blacks can happen once marital preferences
and opportunities change. The previous experiment (Table 1.19) shows that if meetings
become uniformly random, the marriage rate of black females raises to 69.5% (increased
by 32.5%). The gap in the marriage rate between black and white females decreases by
91.7%. In addition, as shown in Table 1.20, if all couples get the same marital preferences,
the marriage rate of black males becomes 72.0% (increased by 18.1%), and the gap between white and black males is eliminated by 89.7%. These exercises suggest that rare
opportunities of interracial marriages and low marital utilities of black males may explain
the greater portion of low marriage rates for blacks than the unbalanced gender ratio.61
Table 1.23: Experiment: population 2050
year 2050
W
B
H
S
white male
0.682 0.004 0.035 0.279
white female
0.682 0.007 0.040 0.271
black male
0.029 0.573 0.029 0.369
black female
0.012 0.500 0.034 0.454
Hispanic male
0.083 0.019 0.708 0.190
Hispanic female 0.071 0.015 0.711 0.203
Total
(inter marriage=8.1%)

index
0.886
0.850
0.896
0.906
0.819
0.843
0.858

baseline
W
B
H
S
0.716 0.003 0.020 0.261
0.710 0.006 0.023 0.262
0.037 0.553 0.021 0.390
0.015 0.487 0.022 0.476
0.142 0.025 0.602 0.231
0.128 0.021 0.612 0.240
(inter marriage=6.1%)

index
0.862
0.833
0.896
0.920
0.752
0.776
0.837

Notes: Predicted type distribution in steady-state stocks. Fraction in each state: being married to column type spouses (W:white,
B:black, H:Hispanic), or being single (S:single). Balanced black gender ratio: model outcomes under the type distribution expected in
2050. Baseline: model outcomes under the type distribution in 2000.

The last experiment predicts marital outcomes for a population in 2050 where there
are substantial increases in the number of minorities. The population share of whites,
60 For

detailed results, see Table 3.1 in Appendix 3.6.
outcomes are consistent with findings from previous papers that link the decline in the marriage
rate of black women to a fall in the pool of ‘marriagable’ black men. Examples are Wilson (1987), Brien
(1997), Sietz (2009) and Keane and Wolpin (2010).
61 These
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blacks, Hispanics and others is expected to change from {0.718, 0.121, 0.114, 0.047} in
2000 to {0.512, 0.136, 0.248, 0.104} in 2050.62 Under the new distribution, there is an increase of interracial marriages, from 6.1% to 8.1%. However, the fact that a more balanced
type distribution itself can promote intermarriages should be taken into account.63 If I control for the effect of distribution by computing a homogamy index, I find a higher degree
of segregation in year 2050 compared to year 2000. The homogamy index increases from
0.837 to 0.858. This rise is mainly due to the increase in Hispanic homogamous marriages
from 60-61% to 71%. Because of greater numbers of their own type, Hispanics now more
easily meet and marry spouses of the same race, leading to a higher degree of relative racial
homogamy in 2050.64

1.6

Discussion

This section compares the implications of my model with those of frictionless settings. I
then discuss how my framework can be applied to other frictional frameworks.

1.6.1

Comparisons

Frictionless models of the marriage market
I have discussed how the search theoretic framework can contribute to the estimation of the
equilibrium model of the marriage market. While previous studies have done estimations
of the marriage market, many of them are based on frictionless settings, employing estimation methods for discrete choice models.65 The comparison below shows that frictionless
62 Source:

Projections of the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin 1999 to 2100,
Population Projections Program (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). I keep the gender ratios within each race the
same as 2000 levels.
63 If there are two groups with shares (g, 1 − g), the fraction of intermarriage is 2g(1 − g) which is maximized when g = 0.5.
64 A decline in Hispanic intermarriage from the 1990s has also been reported and investigated by Lichter,
Carmalt, and Qian (2011) and Qian and Lichter (2011).
65 The baseline frictionless model introduced in this section is from Choo and Siow (2006b). They first
applied the random utility model by McFadden (1973) to the marriage market context. See the survey by
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settings and frictional settings may differently interpret the same observed marital patterns,
requiring a careful choice of information structure when analyzing two-sided markets.
Let us first summarize the model without search frictions. The model is derived in
a random utility model framework. A decision maker, a single male m (female f ) of type
i ( j) faces a choice among J (I) potential spouse types. The utility that male m of type i
(female f of type j) obtains from marrying female type j (male type i) is Ui jm (Vi j f ). One
of the possible options is staying single, which gives agents utilities of Ui0m for males and
V0 j f for females.

Ui jm = ui j − ti j + εi jm

(1.36)

Vi j f = vi j + ti j + εi j f

(1.37)

Ui0m = ui0 + εi0m

(1.38)

V0 j f = v0 j + ε0 j f

(1.39)

The utility specification includes the systematic component of the base utility ui j , vi j , the
transfer made from the husband to his wife ti j , and the stochastic component denoted as
εi jm and εi j f . Each ε is distributed i.i.d. extreme value.
Male m of i will choose the female type according to

Uim = max{Ui0m , . . . ,Ui jm , . . . ,UiJm }.

(1.40)

The number of i, j marriages demanded by male type i (supplied by female type j), denoted
by ηidj (ηisj ) is given as follows in this Logit model:
lnηidj = lnηi0d + ui j − ui0 − ti j

(1.41)

lnηisj = lnη0s j + vi j − v0 j + ti j

(1.42)

Siow (2008) about the applications and extensions of Choo and Siow’s framework.
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The market clearing condition ηidj = ηisj adjusts the values of transfers and yields the following mapping, allowing the identification of preference parameters from observed data.
This equation (1.43) states that the ratio of the number of i, j marriages to the geometric
average of those types who are unmarried is directly correlated with total marriage utility.


ηi j
ln √
ηi0 η0 j


=

ui j + vi j − ui0 − v0 j
2

(1.43)

The two settings with and without search frictions may result in different interpretations on preferences and the marriage market environment.
Comparison 1. Perfect information on the location of types
This frictionless model depends on the assumption that any individual can demand any type
of the opposite gender because they know where each type is located. This is the major
difference from the frictional models in which meetings arrive exogenously to agents who
know the distribution of types but not the location. These differences become clear when
two equations (1.43) and (1.44) are compared. The counterpart of equation (1.43) can be
computed based on equation (1.16) from the frictional model as follows.
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As shown in equation (1.44), the ratio in equation (1.43) does contain information on the
 1−F(ε ∗ ) 
willingness to accept i j matches through the term, ln δ +λ F(εi j∗ ) . However, it may also
ij

f

be positively correlated with the fraction of these types among singles,

sj
sm
i
Sm , S f

, and bias in

opportunity, µi j . As a result, if equation (1.43) is used for recovering preference parameters
of frictional settings, it tends to overestimate the marriage payoff to the two types whose
shares are large in the marriage market or two types who meet each other more frequently.
This bias may stem from the specification of information and the matching process in the
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frictionless model.
Comparison 2. Singlehood as a choice option
The frictionless model treats staying single as one of the choice alternatives, together with
marrying all possible types. In contrast, in the frictional framework, agents choose between
acceptance and rejection upon a meeting that is randomly arrived at with a certain partner
type and a specific value of match quality. Thus, staying in a singlehood state is related to
some involuntary features such as an unlucky history of bad arrivals and draws. This issue
has further implications in the estimated results. The payoffs attached to singlehood in
the frictionless model ui0 and v0 j in equations (1.38) (1.39) are comparable to equilibrium
f

objects Uim and U j in flow term,

(r + δ )Uim =

σ (1 − β ) ∑l αilm

´∞

εil∗ [1 − F(x)]dx

r+δ +λ

.

(1.45)

According to this equation, ui0 , v0 j in the frictionless models may depend on all structural
parameters in a highly nonlinear fashion. Treating those values as primitive may, consequently, cause problems in counterfactual analysis and policy evaluations. This issue is
more crucial in the model in which payoffs to singlehood are the baseline utility to all other
payoffs.66
Comparison 3. idiosyncratic taste shocks to each type
The two models differ in their specification of idiosyncratic taste shocks. In the frictionless model, each shock is attached to each option, that is, each type of potential spouses.
Different individuals can be viewed as identical if they are classified in the same group. In
contrast, in the frictional framework, if a meeting occurs, the person one meets is unique
in terms of availability and pair-specific match quality (ε), even though all persons in the
66 This

difference in the interpretation of singlehood partially depends on the static nature of Choo and
Siow’s baseline model. This issue will be addressed by Choo and Siow (2007) in the dynamic extension of
Choo and Siow (2006b)’s baseline framework.
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same type are ex-ante treated as the same. Different theoretical properties can be derived
from two distinct specifications.67

Stable matching
Starting with the seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962), stable matching has been a key
concept in matching markets including marriage markets. In a stable matching, no matched
pair prefers to be single or no unmatched pair can later find out that they can both do better
by abandoning their current partners and matching each other.68
In their studies of mating preferences, Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely (2010a) predict
matching outcomes based on this Gale-Shapley algorithm and the estimated mate preferences. Preferences are estimated based on the revealed preference argument using the data
from online dating sites where users’ browsing behaviors (choice-sets) and contacts (onesided acceptances) are directly observed. These researchers then use the Gale-Shapley
deferred acceptance algorithm to simulate match outcomes for a general population based
on recovered preference parameters.69 They argue that since the predicted mating patterns
resemble observed matching patterns, preferences, rather than search frictions or opportunities, are the main cause of sorting in marriages.
67 Chapter

2 of this dissertation shows that this option-specific shock specification of frictionless models
leads to negative group size effects. As the share of one type increases, the marital prospects to individuals
of this type decrease. The reason is the following. Some people, depending on their shock realizations,
demand intermarriages and the size of this demand is larger when coming from majorities rather than from
minorities. Because market clearing prices become favorable for minorities, minorities enjoy better matching
prospects than majorities in this frictionless setting. Meanwhile, under the particular assumption of matching
preferences that people prefer the same-type, the frictional model with uniformly random meetings may
provide better matching outcomes to majorities who have more opportunities for intrameetings compared to
minorities.
68 See Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2011) and Roth (2008) for an overview of stable matching and deferred
acceptance algorithms, and Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2011) for applications of stable matching in the
context of the marriage market. See also Fox (2009) for a survey on structural empirical work using two-sided
matching games in various applications.
69 The deferred acceptance algorithm works in the following manner: the one side of the market makes
proposals to agents on the opposite side based on the order reflecting their preferences. Those who receive
more proposals than they accept hold their best preferred proposal and reject the others. In the next round,
agents who have been rejected make new proposals. The process continues until there are no rejected agents
who wish to make further proposals. At this point, all proposals held are finally accepted to constitute a
matching.

48

However, in the absence of a centralized marriage market, there is no explicit mapping between this deferred acceptance algorithm and the process of forming marriages.
Furthermore, search frictions allow the conditions of stable matching to be violated. In
other words, it is possible that the marriage market equilibrium has two pairs (for example,
AB +CD) whose members of those pairs find switching their spouses would increase their
utilities (AD +CB  AB +CD). The alternative and possibly profitable matches (AD +CB)
would not occur if there were no such meetings.
Accordingly, the coincidence of stable matching outcomes mimicking the observed
outcomes may not guarantee the dominant role of preferences. According to my preferences estimates in Table 1.10, the unique stable matching is perfect homogamy.70 This result is in sharp contrast with my counterfactual experiment without preference differences
in Table 1.20 that shows limited effects of preferences. Since agents differ in meeting
opportunities with different potential spouses, type-independent preferences alone cannot
generate fewer homogamous marriages. Observed homogamy patterns can be obtained
once heterogeneity in meeting opportunities are considered.
My results, on the contrary, suggest that search frictions (limited meeting opportunities) play a dominant role in observed marriage patterns. To quantify the direction and the
strength of search frictions is the principal contribution of this paper. The results show that
search frictions do not necessary scatter sorting patterns or preclude optimal assignments
as in standard matching models. The existence of search frictions or the process of meetings may enhance efficient sorting patterns. By explicitly incorporating and estimating how
search frictions play a role in the process of match formation, my model can contribute to
a better understanding of preferences and opportunities in the marriage market.
70 The standard Gale-Shapley mechanism is based on nontransferable utility. In transferable utility models,
the marriage market equilibrium is obtained where the sum of marital output in society is maximized (Shapley
and Shubik 1972). I ignore idiosyncratic shocks for this prediction. All white males (of measure 0.743)
marry their female counterparts, and all Hispanic females (0.117) marry Hispanic males. There are HW
intermarriages (0.002). Some white females (0.004) and all black males (0.118) and females (0.134) remain
single.
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1.6.2

Applications

Frictional models of the labor market
My model of the marriage market can be compared to the labor market with firms and workers. However, there are several obstacles for this model being applied to the labor market
settings. The main difference between labor models and marriage models are the symmetric features of the marriage market. Agents in the marriage market, males and females, face
an identical environment with respect to their strategies and information whereas firms and
workers in the labor market solve different optimization problems (e.g., firms may make
take-it-or-leave-it offers to workers, or inflows of firms may be determined by the zero
profit condition.) These asymmetric features become crucial also in terms of data availability. In the marriage market, major traits of both married or single males and females are
observed by econometricians, allowing them to identify relevant parameters. In contrast,
the labor search estimation suffers from the problems involving unobserved firm characteristics even though researchers have better data on transfers (wage). As a result, to the best
of my knowledge, there is no paper that estimates type-independent meetings (wage offer
arrivals) in the labor market.71
However, there are still questions to be investigated using my frameworks in the context of the labor market. For example, regarding the patterns that women tend to work
for lower paying jobs, two potential explanations can be compared: 1) women get nonpecuniary benefits from those jobs (preferences), and 2) women receive limited opportunities. This question can be answered even based on one-sided (worker-sided) data, where
firm types and durations involving match formation and dissolution are recorded.72
71 See

Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) and Hagedorn, Law, and Manovskii (2012) for further discussion on
recovering preferences (production functions) in the labor market settings.
72 See Appendix 3.5 for how one-sided model can be constructed and identified as an application of my
framework. The questions on gender/race discrimination have been analyzed by many researchers including
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), Flabbi (2010), and Flabbi and Moro (2012). However, different preferences and
opportunities regarding observed characteristics of jobs have not been yet simultaneously addressed.
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Frictional discrete choice models of consumers
My framework can be applied to the analysis of discrete choice models where one side
of the model is sellers and the other side buyers, or one-sided models of buyers. Researchers can separately identify preferences (consumer i’s utility from consuming good j)
and opportunities (the arrival rate of good j to consumer i) based on duration and transition data.73 Understanding these differential effects of opportunity and preference may be
crucial in the analysis of frictional markets where all options are not always available. Possible applications include preference and opportunity effects of regulations and subsidies,
the introduction of new products, and marketing strategies.
My paper can be related, for example, to Ackerberg (2001, 2003) on the effects of
advertisements. He compares differential effects of advertisements on experienced and
inexperienced users to distinguish between informative effects and prestige effects of advertising in the yogurt market. Informative effects lead consumers to be informed of the
existence and characteristics of advertised goods, and Ackerberg assumes that only inexperienced consumers are affected by this effect. In contrast, prestige effects increase a
consumer’s utility of consuming advertised goods, affecting both experienced and inexperienced consumers.74
Unlike Ackerberg’s focus on non-durable goods, my framework is suitable for durable
goods. Using information about which good consumers choose, how long it takes to make
this choice, and how long they use this durable good, researchers may be able to disentangle preference effects (prestige effects) from opportunity effects (stimulative effects) of
advertising. The opportunity effects take place by reminding consumers of the advertised
good (arrivals of this good to consumers as a choice option), and potentially differ from
the informative effects. I state that search frictions may exist even in consumer choice settings that appear frictionless. Even though options are always available, consumers do not
73 The

one-sided model introduced in Appendix 3.5 is again applicable in this setting.

74 By observing that advertisements primarily affected inexperienced users, he concludes the primary effect

was that of informing consumers.
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mentally process all options all the time, leaving room for arrivals and stimulation.

Network economics
Lastly, my model is related to the work of Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009, 2010) on preferences vs. opportunities in racial homophily (high frequencies of same-race friendship) in
the many-sided markets (network formation). The model proposed by these researchers do
not allow rejection of meetings, recovering opportunity differences directly from observed
frequencies of friendships. They then use the variation in the number of friendships to infer
preference differences. For example, if individuals have strong same-race preferences and
meet the same-race persons often, they will have a large number of friends.
Instead of using variations in the number of friends as they do, one can use the data on
how long friendships last to disentangle preferences from opportunities. Using dynamics of
match formation is more appropriate for the marriage market where all unions are monogamous. I can further distinguish white’ taste for blacks verses white’ taste for Hispanics
whereas the approach by Curraini et al. can only estimate taste for own type compared to
other types combined. In addition, the approach I propose not only can recover the differences in preferences and opportunities for all possible pairings, but also can quantify the
relative strength of each channel. Therefore, my identification method can shed light on
match/relationship formation in various settings.

1.7

Conclusion

The equilibrium marriage market model developed in this paper analyzes the relative importance of preferences and opportunities as potential sources of racial homogamy. In the
model, individuals are heterogeneous in their marital opportunities (meetings) and preferences. Married couples differ in match qualities, which are updated at a Poisson rate that
is common across marriage types. Under this assumption, variations in the duration of
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marriages can be used to identify the willingness to accept certain types of marriage separately from arrival rates, even in the absence of data on choice sets. I estimate the structural
parameters via a three-step estimation procedure. The estimated model closely replicates
the patterns of marital formation and dissolution in the data. My results show that even
though same-race preferences exist, the racial homogamy observed is primarily caused by
the rarity of interracial meetings in the United States.
In addition, the model is also used to simulate the effect of an increased share of
black males in the population relative to their current share. Empirical results indicate that
the high rate of singlehood for black women is partly attributable to a shortage of black
males. Lastly, I use the model to predict the effects of an increasing Hispanic population,
showing that the increase will lead to more Hispanic intramarriages and a higher degree of
homogamy.
The significant role of meetings in matching patterns that this research finds may
further motivate studies on social interactions and networks in broader settings.75 In these
studies, the idea that choice opportunities are sometimes granted to individuals who are
restricted by their environment should be carefully considered. Search frictional frameworks proposed in this paper may be helpful for studies of social interactions and network
formation.
There are several ways to extend my model. Household bargaining information
can be incorporated to identify husbands’ and wives’ individual gains from different marriages. Building on Wong (2003b), Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque (2012),
and Dupuy and Galichon (2012), one can study marriage markets with multiple attributes
where people are differentiated by their race and human capital.
To address recent changes in interracial marriage patterns and attitudes and in search
technologies (e.g., online dating sites), the model can be extended to have time-varying
preferences and opportunities. Building on Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004), determinants
75 See

McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) and Jackson (2011) for an overview.
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and generational evolution of types, preferences, and opportunities can be considered. Estimation of such models would require enough samples of interracial marriages and additional information on how meetings take place.
Lastly, the methods developed in this paper are applicable to other frictional search
settings, such as two-sided markets with firms and workers, or buyers and sellers, and onesided or many-to-many markets where researchers can observe the dynamics of matches.
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Chapter 2
Matching along Horizontal
Differentiations
This chapter analyzes the effects of horizontal differentiations and search frictions in twosided markets with transferable utility. There are two types of individuals (a majority type
and a minority type) and agents prefer same-type partners. In a model with search frictions
where meetings are random and transfers are determined via Nash bargaining, minorities
seldom meet same-type individuals and suffer from poor outside options. In contrast, I
show that minorities have better matching prospects than majority members in frictionless
frameworks where locations are known and transfers are collectively determined by market
clearing conditions.
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2.1

Introduction

People often prefer partners of the same type. In the marriage market, for example, singles
may wish to marry a spouse of the same ethnicity or religion to share their cultural heritage
with family members. In the labor market and academia, workers and scholars may want
to collaborate with partners in the same field. In these cases, agents are horizontally differentiated with respects to their qualitative traits. The criterion behind evaluating horizontal
traits is ‘the more similar, the better.’
These horizontal differentiations can be compared to vertical differentiations. With
respect to some quantitative traits, such as income and physical attractiveness, the evaluation criterion is ‘the more, the better.’ According to this standard, people are vertically
ranked. Whereas matching along vertical dimensions has been extensively investigated in
the literature in economics, little is known about matching along horizontal differentiations.1 Previous studies which do not address horizontal differentiations often assume that
the overall market is decomposed into various sub-markets for each horizontal type. However, as matches across types are empirically reported, there is a need for careful analysis
of the interactions among horizontally differentiated agents.
This paper studies the implications of horizontal differentiations in two-sided matching models with and without search frictions. In both settings, there are two types of individuals (a majority type and a minority one). Agents prefer partners of the same type and
matching gains are transferable. Frictional and frictionless settings demonstrate contrasting
matching outcomes for two groups. In frictional settings, majorities have better matching
prospects than minorities. Inversely, matching outcomes are better for minorities com1 Studies

on this assortative matching are motivated by Becker (1973). Search and matching along vertical dimensions are investigated by Burdett and Coles (1997) in non-transferable utility frameworks, and
by Shimer and Smith (2000) in transferable utility frameworks. For more surveys of search and matching
models in the context of the labor market and the marriage market, see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005)
and Burdett and Coles (1999).
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pared to majorities in frictional settings. This analysis, therefore, sheds light not only on
aspects of identities and diversity, but also on different matching and price-determination
mechanisms of frictional and frictionless frameworks.
I first develop a two-sided random search model which builds on Pissarides (2000)
and Shimer and Smith (2000). Singles wait for meeting opportunities that occur randomly
depending on the type distribution of the opposite side of the market. Upon meeting, a
male and a female agree to form a match with a positive surplus. This matching surplus
is then divided via Nash Bargaining. In this setting, minorities have a poor outside option
(or threat point) since they have less frequent meetings with members of their own group.
This will reduce the transfer to minorities from majorities in their intermarriages and lower
matching prospects of minorities.
The second setting adopts the frictionless framework of Choo and Siow (2006b).
Individuals can demand any type of potential spouse based on their match preferences
and idiosyncratic taste shocks attached to each type of the opposite side. Match transfers
are determined by market clearing conditions. Depending on shock realizations, some
individuals prefer inter-type matches. The number of majority type individuals preferring
an intermarriage will be greater than the number of minorities that prefer marrying across
types, which generates a higher relative demand and eventually higher prices (transfers) for
minorities. For this reason, minorities enjoy better matching outcomes than majorities in a
frictionless setting where their locations are known and prices are collectively determined
to clear the market. Consequently, the group size effects have different signs in two settings.
Depending on model assumptions on information and price-determination, being unique
may or may not be appreciated.
I further generalize the model, analyzing two different criteria of evaluating potential
partners; horizontal differentiations and vertical differentiations. Allowing the interactions
of two differentiations, the model obtains implications on matching assortativeness in horizontal and vertical dimensions. Depending on the degree of modularity, high types may or
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may not be engaged more in inter-horizontal marriages than low types.
While my research is related to a few papers that study preferences for the similar,
it still differs from those studies. Bisin and Verdier (2000) investigate the implications of
these preferences on cultural transmission and evolution of types, whereas my work focuses
more on individual matching outcomes. Alpern and Reyniers (1999) in biology, and Gautier and Teulings (2012) in labor economics analyzes models with preferences for partners
who are close to oneself. However, due to their assumption that types are continuous and
uniformly distributed, these papers are unable to study the group size effects, the analysis
of which constitutes the main contribution of my paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. A frictional model and its properties are
discussed in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 explores a frcitionless framework which results in the
opposite implications from those of the frictional model. Extensions and conclusions are
presented in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5.

2.2

The Model with Search Frictions

There is a unit measure of infinitely-lived males and females who are interested in forming
bilateral relationship. Males and females can represent each side of any two-sided markets
with frictions where agents look for long-term partners, such as markets with firms and
workers or buyers and sellers. There are two types of individuals, A and B. Let g denote
the share of A types and 1 − g denote the share of B types in each side.
Time is continuous and individual discount the future at the rate of r. Suppose also
that there is no divorce, thus marriage is an absorbing stage. Marriage i j denotes a match
between a husband of type i and a wife of type j. For marital preferences, assume Q > 0 and
τ > 0. Let us assume that the discounted lifetime value of marriages between same types
(AA, BB) is 2Q, while the discounted lifetime value of intermarriage (AB, BA) is 2(Q −
τ). Since it is assumed that Q > 0, individuals prefer the state of same-type marriage
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compared to the state of singlehood where flow payoff from being single is normalized to
0. τ measures a penalty for intermarriage. Assuming τ > 0 induces individuals to prefer to
marry within their own group.
Individuals meet the potential spouse of the opposite side with a Poisson rate of α.
Meeting is random, thus conditional on meeting, the probability that the potential spouse
of a meeting is type A (type B) is given by g (1 − g). Once two singles meet, they decide
to marry or not. When couples decide to marry, they determine how to divide the matching
surplus, the gap between value of being married and being single. I assume the symmetric
Nash Bargaining where two parties divide the surplus equally. The outside option in this
bargaining procedure is the value of staying single as each type.
I further adopt the cloning assumption. If two singles are matched and exit the marriage market, two new singles with the identical types, who could be understood as their
offspring, enter and replace their predecessors. Therefore, the distribution of type among
male and female singles (g, 1 − g) and the measure of singles 1 stay constant.
For simplicity, I focus only on symmetric pure strategy equilibria. Mixed strategy
equilibria or the case husbands and wives strategies regarding the same marriage differ are
not considered. Under this setting, males and females both agree to form a match with a
positive match surplus. Let βi j be an indicator of whether a match forms: βi j = 1 if i and j
form a match upon meeting and then exit the marriage market; and βi j = 0 if i and j do not
form a match upon meeting and return to the marriage market as singles.
Let Vi j denote the discounted lifetime value of type i being married to spouse j,
which is given by the following.

2VAA = 2VBB = 2Q
(VAB +VBA ) = 2(Q − τ)

(2.1)
(2.2)

Vi denotes the discounted lifetime value of type i, which will be derived by the fol-

59

lowing two equations.

rVA = αgβAA (VAA −VA ) + α(1 − g)βAB (VAB −VA )

(2.3)

rVB = αgβBA (VBA −VB ) + α(1 − g)βBB (VBB −VB ).

(2.4)

Lemma 1. Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. Assuming symmetric Nash
Bargaining implies the following:
1. βAA = 1 if and only if Q ≥ VA , VAA = Q.
2. βBB = 1 if and only if Q ≥ VB , VBB = Q.
3. βAB = βBA = 1 if and only if 2(Q − τ) ≥ VA + VB . They divide surpluses such that
A −VB
A −VB
VAB = VA + 2(Q−τ)−V
and VBA = VB + 2(Q−τ)−V
.
2
2

Lemma 1 implies that meetings lead to marriages when surpluses are positive. The
same type husbands and wives get the same discounted utility value in their homogamous
marriages. In intermarriages, marital utilities of each depend on the outside option, being
a single of each type.
Under the Nash Bargaining solution, equations (2.3) and (2.4) become

rVA = αgβAA (Q −VA ) + α(1 − g)βAB
rVB = αgβBA

2(Q − τ) −VA −VB
2

2(Q − τ) −VA −VB
+ α(1 − g)βBB (Q −VB ).
2

(2.5)
(2.6)

The following proposition demonstrates different types of equilibria depending on
the parameter values. Several crucial parameters are τ, the penalty for intermarriage, and
x ≡ αr , which captures the degree of search frictions where high x indicates severe search
frictions.
Proposition 1. Two types of pure strategy equilibria. Under the Nash Bargaining solution, there are two types of pure strategy equilibria. If the penalty for intermarriage is

60

high, τ ≥ τ ∗ ≡

x(1+2x)Q
2(x+g)(x+(1−g)) ,

only homogamous marriages (AA, BB) are formed in the

equilibrium (the homogamous equilibrium). If τ < τ ∗ , all matches (AA, BB, AB, BA) are
formed in the equilibrium (the all-matches equilibrium).
Proof. See Appendix 4.1.1.
It is noteworthy that in both equilibria, people always accept homogamous matches.
This is in contrast with the matching outcomes with vertical differentiations with high(H)
and low(L) types analyzed in Burdett and Coles (1999). They assume that H types contribute more to matches than L types. Match utilities are higher in HH marriages and lower
in LL marriages than in HL and LH marriages. Under some parameters, high types receive
enough marital gains from their marriages with low types and reject the other high types
(no HH marriages formed). This happens when high types are minorities, and their HL
matches generate utilities that are sufficiently higher than those from LL matches and close
to utilities from HH matches. However, this result (no AA or BB marriages) cannot be
obtained with horizontal differentiations, where the group size has important implications
for matching prospects. For type i to have enough intermarriage opportunities, the share
of type i needs to decrease. This decrease in type i’s share, with a corresponding increase
in increase in the other type’s share, will lead to a higher threat point of the opposite type,
which prevents type i from collecting enough matching surplus from intermarriage. Accordingly, by only accepting intermarriages and receiving higher transfers from the other
party, singles cannot gain enough matching value that exceeds the surplus from the most
desirable marriages.
x(1+2x)Q
,
Examining the equilibrium threshold of the intermarriage penalty, τ ∗ ≡ 2(x+g)(x+(1−g))

leads to the following claims.
Claim 1. As frictions become severe, singles are more likely to accept intermarriages.
Note that

∂ τ∗
∂x

=

Q(g(1−g)(1+4x)+x2
2(g−g2 +x+x2 )2

≥ 0. As x =

r
α

increases because waiting becomes more

painful (people become impatient, r ↑, or meetings arrives less frequently, α ↓), then singles
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become more willing to accept intermarriages. If frictions vanish, x = 0 (no time discount,
r = 0, or instant arrivals, α → ∞), then τ ∗ = 0, meaning that people always reject intermarriages. This outcome at the limit (x = 0) is consistent with the results expected by the
standard matching model where stability conditions govern equilibrium outcomes. It is also
noteworthy that intermarriages violate the stability condition. If there are JK, KJ matches,
agents will find that switching partners to have JJ, KK matches is a Pareto-improvement.
Claim 2. The more balanced the distribution of types, the less chance of forming intermarriages.
Note that

∂ τ∗
∂g

=

−(1−2g)Q(1+2x)x
2(g−g2 +x+x2 )2

< 0 if g < 21 , and ≥ 0 if g ≥ 21 . When g approaches 0

or 1, the all-matches equilibrium is obtained in a larger set of parameter values. When
the distribution of types becomes lopsided, minorities who face lower marriage prospects
(lower value of being singles) make the condition 2(Q − τ) ≥ VA + VB less restrictive. In
contrast, when g becomes closer to 12 (when the shares of two groups become even), staying
single to wait for the ideal type becomes more affordable, thereby making both sides more
selective in evaluating intermarriages.
Note also that two claims are about the possibility that the economy is at the allmatches equilibrium as opposed to the homogamous equilibrium. The claim is not about the
measure of intermarriages. Once the economy is at the all-matches equilibrium in all ranges
of g, which happens when τ <

2Qx
1+2x ,

the fraction of intermarriages among all marriages is

determined as 2g(1 − g), which is maximized when the distribution is balanced, g = 12 .
When singles accept all marriages (including intermarriages), fraction g of all types marry
A type spouses, and fraction 1 − g of all types marry B type spouses.2
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the partition of equilibria over (g, τ) space where other parameters are set to Q = 1, α = 0.25, and r = 0.04. Line τ ∗ ≡
2 In

x(1+2x)Q
2(x+g)(x+(1−g))

=

0.1056
0.1856+g−g2

other word, in the all-matches equilibrium, people accept intermarriage as likely as homogamous
marriage. This result changes when the assumption on deterministic match utilities is relaxed. By introducing
match quality shocks as in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the outcomes where people accept homogamous
marriages more easily than intermarriage can be demonstrated.
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divides the parameter set regions into areas involving two different equilibria: the homogamous equilibrium with only AA, BB and the all-matches equilibrium with all AA, BB, AB, BA.
Claim 1 is related to potential upward shifts of τ ∗ upon higher values of x, which will lead to
wider regions for all-matches equilibrium. Claim 2 is reflected in the U shape of τ ∗ which
obtains its minimum at g = 21 , where the parameter region for the all-matches equilibrium
is minimized.

Figure 2.1: Equilibrium set in (g, τ) space

This model also provides several implications regarding the group size effects on
matching outcomes.
Proposition 2. Positive group size effects. Under same-type preferences (τ > 0), the
following holds.
i In all equilibria, Vi is strictly increasing in the fraction of singles with trait i.
ii In all-matches equilibrium, transfer to i in his or her intermarriage is strictly increasing
in the fraction of i.
Proof. Under the homogamous equilibrium, the value of being single as type i and its first
63

derivative with respect of the fraction of type i, gi are given by
Vihomo =

gi Q
gi + x

∂Vihomo
Qx
=
> 0.
∂ gi
(Q + x)2

(2.7)
(2.8)

The outcomes under the all-matches equilibrium are given by the following:
Q(1 + 2x) − 2(1 − gi )(1 − gi + x) τ
1 + 3x + 2x2
∂Viall 2(2(1 − gi + x) τ
=
> 0.
∂ gi
1 + 3x + 2x2
Viall =

(2.9)
(2.10)

The transfer that type i gets from his or her spouse j in their intermarriage, t j→i , is given
by the following and is strictly increasing in gi .
−(1 − 2gi ) τ
1
t j→i = (Vi −V j ) =
2
1 + 2x
∂t j→i
2τ
=
> 0.
∂ gi
1 + 2x

(2.11)
(2.12)

Although horizontally differentiated agents find homogamous marriages the most desirable, they are nevertheless subject to search frictions. Under random arrivals, the opportunities of homogamous marriages occur at a lower rate to minorities than majorities, which
worsens the matching prospects of minorities. Therefore, when a minority and a majority
type form an intermarriage, more transfers go to the majority member due to his or her
higher threat point in bargaining. This positive sign of group size effects contrasts with the
outcome from frictionless frameworks introduced in the next section.
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2.3

The Model without Search Frictions

Major differences between frictional and frictionless frameworks are their assumptions
about information and price-determination. Whereas the frictional framework in Section
2.2 assumes that forming a match with type j is available only upon a meeting with type
j that occurs in uncertain intervals, frictionless frameworks assume that people can demand any type if they want to marry that type. While the model in Section 2.2 supposes
that transfers are determined individually via Nash bargaining, transfers in the frictionless
frameworks are determined collectively based on market clearing conditions. However, as
I discuss earlier in Claim 1, the standard frictionless model cannot generate intermarriages
that violate the stability conditions. I therefore need to introduce some types of disturbances to allow intermarriages in the economy. The framework introduced by Choo and
Siow (2006b) provides a suitable model to explore the marriage market where intermarriages are present. In this Section, two models (frictional and frictionless) are compared
with respect to their opposite conclusions about the group size effects on matching outcomes under horizontal differentiations.
This frictionless model is based on a random utility model framework. A decision
maker, a single male m(female f ) of type i( j) faces a choice among J(I) potential spouse
types. The utility that male i(female j) obtains from marrying j(i) is Ui jm (Vi j f ). One of the
options to be chosen is staying single which gives male i and female j utilities of Ui0m and
V0 j f .

Ui jm = ui j − ti j + εi jm

(2.13)

Vi j f = vi j + ti j + εi j f

(2.14)

Ui0m = ui0 + εi0m

(2.15)

V0 j f = v0 j + ε0 j f

(2.16)

This utility specification has the systematic component of the base utility ui j , vi j and trans65

fer made from the husband to his wife ti j , and the stochastic component denoted as εi jm and
εi j f . Each ε is an independently and identically distributed random variable from a type I
extreme-value distribution. These shocks are specific to each available type in the opposite
side of the market.
Male m of i will choose the female type according to

Uim = max{Ui0m , . . . ,Ui jm , . . . ,UiJm }.

(2.17)

The number of i, j marriages demanded by male type i (supplied by female type j), denoted
by µidj (µisj ) is given as follows in this Logit model.
d
lnµidj = lnµi0
+ ui j − ui0 − ti j

(2.18)

lnµisj = lnµ0s j + vi j − v0 j + ti j

(2.19)

The market clearing condition µidj = µisj adjusts the values of transfers and yields the following mapping, allowing us to link underlying preference parameters to matching outcomes.
The following equation (2.20) suggests that the ratio of the number of i, j marriages to
the geometric average of those types who are unmarried is directly correlated with total
marriage utility.


µi j
ln √
µi0 µ0 j


=

ui j + vi j − ui0 − v0 j
2

(2.20)

Let us now consider a simple gender-symmetric case where there are two types i ∈
A, B of males and females. When agents marry a spouse of the same race, type i gets
uii = vii , ∀i. When they marry a spouse of the other type (AB or BA marriages), type A
males and females get uAB = vBA and B types get uBA = vAB . gi is the fraction of i type
singles in males and females, and g denotes gA . Utilities to the option of being single
are normalized to zero, ui0 = v0i = 0 ∀i. For this simple case, closed-form solutions of
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equilibrium outcomes can be obtained.
Proposition 3. Existence and uniqueness of the frictionless market equilibrium. Under symmetric frictionless settings with two types, there exists a unique marriage market
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 4.1.2 for the complete characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Negative group size effects. Regardless of utility specifications, the group
size effect is always negative. In other words, as the fraction of i increases, the marital
prospects of type i decrease.
Proof. Marital prospects of type A are represented by EUA , the utility of being a type A
before seeing the realization of shocks in equation (2.21). EUA decreases in the fraction
of type A, g. As shown in equation (2.22), this property does not depend on preference
parameters. See further development of this proof in Appendix 4.1.2.

EUA =c + ln[1 + euAA +
euAB +uBA (1 − 2g) +

p
euAB +uBA (euAB +uBA (1 − 2g)2 + 4(1 + euAA )(1 + euBB )(1 − g)g
]
2(1 + euBB )g
(2.21)

∂ EUA
euAB +uBA
=− p
∂g
g euAB +uBA (euAB +uBA (1 − 2g)2 + 4(1 + euAA )(1 + euBB )(1 − g)g

(2.22)

Proposition 3 states that, given shock realizations, market clearing prices (transfers),
that make supply and demand consistent, are always found. Proposition 4 demonstrates
the implications of the negative group size effects. Depending on shock realizations, some
individuals prefer inter-type matches. The number of majority individuals preferring an
intermarriage will be greater than the number of minorities that prefer intermarriage, generating a higher relative demand for minorities. For this demand to be cleared, it is necessary that a higher fraction of minorities choose to marry majority members. Therefore,
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this force increases transfers from majorities to minorities, and ultimately leads to better
prospects to minorities due to their scarcity.
Therefore, under horizontal differentiations where singles prefer same-type spouses,
frictional and frictionless models result in the opposite implications for the matching outcomes. The negative group size effects in frictionless models result from the market clearing condition (demand= supply) together with the free information assumption. When these
conditions are replaced by Nash bargaining and random arrivals respectively as given in the
frictional model, the model predicts positive group size effects where majorities enjoy better matching outcomes because of their more frequent same-type meeting opportunities.
The following simulations show the expected values of being type A over g ∈ [0, 1]
in frictional and frictionless cases, where the parameters are set as Q = 1, τ = 0.2 (for the
frictional model, x ≡

r
α

=

0.04
0.25 ).

(a) frictional model

(b) frictionless model

Figure 2.2: Expected utility of being single of type A
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(a) frictional model

(b) frictionless model

Figure 2.3: Transfer from type B to type A

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that, in terms of matching prospects and transfers in
intermarriages, being unique would be undesirable in frictional settings and desirable in
frictionless settings.3

2.4

Horizontal and Vertical Differentiations

Now I apply the framework developed in Section 2.2 to investigate the different types of
preferences in matching. More specifically, this subsection investigates the marital search
and matching equilibrium along two dimensions: vertical and horizontal differentiation.
With vertical differentiation, individuals are ranked and this ranking is universal according
to the standard, ‘the more, the better’, with respect to wealth and beauty. Regardless of
their own beauty, singles may prefer good looking spouses to less attractive ones. In contrast, horizontal differentiation gives individuals religious, ethnic or racial identity, making
them prefer a partner with the same cultural background, which means, ‘the more similar,
the better.’ Overall, this model can analyze two driving forces under positive assortative
matching, producing implications on intercultural marriages and diversity.
Assume further that we have 4 types denoted by {JH, JL, KH, KL}. We have two
3 Even

though the two cases have the same values for Q and τ, the level of utilities cannot be compared.
Singles get higher utilities in the frictional case, not only because there is neither search frictions nor waiting
time, but also because there are additional stochastic utility terms represented by ε.
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horizontal types {J, K} with the share of J given by q and two vertical types {H, L} with
the share of H given by π. The utility from marriages between types is given by Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Flow Utilities from Marriages

JH
JL
KH
KL

JH
QH

JL
QM
QL

KH
QH − τ
QM − τ
QH

KL
QM − τ
QL − τ
QM
QL

The parameters Q is related to the vertical dimension, assumed to be QH ≥ QM ≥ QL . It
reflects ‘The more, the better’ criteria, having more of H types in an union increases the
payoff. The parameter τ measures the penalty to inter-cultural marriages τ ≥ 0, making
singles prefer to marry the one with the same identity. That is, ‘The more similar, the
better’ criteria. It is also assumed that they get no flow utility when single, u = 0.

2.4.1

Vertical Differentiation

Along the vertical differentiation such as wealth, beauty and education, what matters most
is the the gap between different types of marriages. Let 4HM , 4ML denote QH − QM and
QM − QL , respectively. The patterns of the different equilibria also depend on the share of
H types, π. Figure 2.4 (Figure 2.5 ) shows the case where π is sufficiently low, π < π ∗
(high, π > π ∗ ).4
4π ∗

= 12 − αr . Other parameters take values QL = 1, τ = 0, π = .25, α = .25, r = (0 or .04).
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(a) r → 0

(b) r = .04

Figure 2.4: Equilibrium set in (4ML , 4HM ) space

(a) r → 0

(b) r = .04

Figure 2.5: Equilibrium set in (4ML , 4HM ) space

The important feature regarding vertical differentiations is the modularity of the utility function. In other words, the type of equilibria responds to the modularity. When r → 0
and 4HM > 4ML ⇔ QH + QL > 2QM (supermodularity of household production function),
the economy does not have HL marriages which are not efficient according to the criteria
by Becker (1973)Becker (1973). In the area of 4HM < 4ML (submodularity), we may
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have the equilibrium in which high types reject each other. This arises when QH is not sufficiently higher than QM and the share of high types π is low. Under these circumstances,
H types can collect enough surplus from their marriages with L types, thus rejecting the
other H types.5
As shown in Figure 2.4.(b) and 2.5.(b), when there are search frictions, the acceptance strategies of singles are not as efficient as the case without frictions (Figure 2.4,2.5
(a) in which r converges to 0 ) and the mixed marriage equilibrium with all marriage types
may arise in a large set of parameters.

2.4.2

Interaction

Figure 2.6: Equilibrium set in (4ML , 4HM ) space

The interaction between horizontal and vertical differentiations also depends on the modularity of the household production function. Figure 2.6 presents the different equilibria in
(4ML , 4HM ) space where QL = 1, τ = .2, π = .25, α = .25, r = .04, q = .25. Due to the
5 The

horizontal differentiation imposes supermodularity of the household production, thus the similar
pattern (e.g., majorities reject each other) will never happen.
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disutility τ, inter-cultural unions are the most responsive to inefficiency in vertical dimensions. See also that the in-cultural unions between two majority types are more responsive
in inefficiency than two minority types. This is because that majority types with the higher
value of staying single are more willing to wait for vertically efficient matches. For example
in Figure 2.6, when HL marriages become less desirable (the parameters move to the upper
left corner, supermodularity), people stop JHKL and JLKH marriages first and then KHKL
marriage, then finally JHJL marriages. In summary, people accept inter-horizontal marriages when they can enjoy high surplus gains in their combination of vertical dimensions.
Depending on parameter values, high types may or may not engage more in inter-horizontal
marriages than low types.6

2.5

Conclusion

This paper has analyzed two-sided matching models with and without search frictions in order to study the effects of horizontal differentiations. Unlike vertical differentiations where
agents prefer partners of better types, horizontally differentiated agents prefer partners of
the same type. Under horizontal differentiations, frameworks with and without search frictions result in opposite implications for matching outcomes of majorities and minorities.
The frictional setting provides better matching prospects to majority members who
frequently meet potential partners of their own type and thus have a better outside option in
intermarriage bargaining. One the other hand, minorities expect better matching outcomes
in the frictionless setting where agents can demand any type of potential spouses depending
on taste shocks and the division of matching surplus is adjusted by the market clearing
condition. In conclusion, my analysis indicates that the specification of frictions and price6 For example, if we are in the equilibrium without JLKL marriages, high types engage all marriages
while low types do not inter-horizontally marry with low type spouses. Thus we observe that high types
marry more inter-culturally than low types. In contrast, if we are in the equilibrium without JHKH marriages
(at the bottom left corner of Figure 2.6), low types are observed to inter-horizontally marry more than high
types. The intermarriage premium, the pattern that high types intermarry more than low types since they can
offset the disutility cause by their intermarriages, analyzed in some literature (Wong 2003 Wong (2003a)), is
not a universal phenomenon according to my model.
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determination should be carefully considered in an investigation of two-sided markets with
horizontally differentiated agents.
There are a number of potentially interesting applications and extensions of the analysis. The model can be extended to more than two types to represent some relevant settings. The interactions between horizontal and vertical differentiations lead to interesting
findings on matching outcomes and group behaviors. The assortativeness along vertical differentiations (e.g., positive correlations of husbands’ and wives’ income) can be affected
by horizontal dimensions of couples. Minorities and majorities may exhibit different tendencies to match along vertical traits, which may also lead to new insights on distribution
of resources across groups. Also, one could consider endogenizing types by modeling how
types of entrants are determined either by self-investment in vertical traits as in Burdett and
Coles (2001) or by parents’ cultural transmission in horizontal traits as in Bisin and Verdier
(2000).
Finally, the framework and the questions proposed in this question may be useful for addressing a variety of empirical and policy related issues in two-sided matching
markets. Horizontal differentiations and search frictions may particularly matter when researchers study resource allocation outcomes inside matches (households or worker-firm
units). The contrasting group size effects depending on settings with and without search
frictions should be considered when policy makers aim to subsidize disadvantaged groups
in the economy.
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Chapter 3
Appendix to Chapter 1
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3.1

Proofs and derivations

3.1.1

Proof of Proposition 1

Proposition 1 (The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium reservation strategies ε ∗ )
f
m f
∗
Given {um
i j , ui j , F(.), σ , M(., .), µi j , λ , β , r, δ } and distributions (s , s ), the solution ε to
equation (1.13) exists and is unique.
f

εi∗j +

um
λ
i j + ui j
ϕ(εi∗j ) +
=
r+δ +λ
σ
1
f
{(1 − β ) ∑ αilm (sm , s f )ϕ(εil∗ ) + β ∑ αk j (sm , s f )ϕ(εk∗j )}
r+δ +λ
l
k
(1.13)

Proof.
Step 1: Existence
f
Note that given (sm , s f ), arrivals (αimj , αi j ) are also treated as given. Let ψ(ε) = ε +
λ
r+δ +λ ϕ(ε). Define ε̌i j (ε) as follows.
f

ε̌i j (ε) =ψ −1 −

um
i j + ui j
σ

1
f
+
{(1 − β ) ∑ αilm ϕ(εil ) + β ∑ αk j ϕ(εk j )}
r+δ +λ
l
k

!
(3.1)

It has the following properties.
f

{(1 − β )αimj + β αi j }[1 − F(εi j )]
∂ ε̌i j
<0
= −
∂ εi j
r + δ + λ F(εi j )
(1 − β )αilm [1 − F(εil )]
∂ ε̌i j
= −
< 0 if l 6= j
∂ εil
r + δ + λ F(εi j )

(3.2)
(3.3)

f

β αk j [1 − F(εk j )]
∂ ε̌i j
= −
< 0 if k 6= i
∂ εk j
r + δ + λ F(εi j )
∂ ε̌i j
= 0 if k 6= i and l 6= j
∂ εkl

(3.4)
(3.5)

Define a vector valued function, ε̌ = (ε̌11 , ..., ε̌IJ ). The solution of the problem ε ∗ satisfies
ε ∗ = ε̌(ε ∗ ), ε ∗ as a fixed point of ε̌(.). We can find upper and lower bind of ε̌i j by setting
ε i j = ε̌i j ({∞}I×J ) and ε̄i j = ε̌i j ({ε}I×J ).1 The lower and upper bounds, ε and ε̄, for an
appropriate domain can be picked, ε = min{ε i j } and ε̄ = max{ε̄i j } for all i, j. Then, ε̌ is
a continuous function which maps [ε, ε̄]I×J into itself. Note that [ε, ε̄]I×J is a nonempty,
1 Note

that ϕ(ε) is bounded above and unbounded below.
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closed, convex subset of a finite-dimensional real vector. Existence is established by applying the Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem.2
Step 2: Uniqueness
Recall the equations (1.10)-(1.12) that constitute the equilibrium cutoff strategies εi∗j . For
this proof, U denotes male value function, U m , and V denotes female value functions, U f
for simplicity.
f

∗
(r + δ )Zi j (εi∗j ) = um
i j + ui j + σ εi j +

σλ
ϕ(εi∗j ) − (r + δ )Ui − (r + δ )V j = 0 (1.10)
r+δ +λ

σ (1 − β )
r+δ +λ

∑ αilm ϕ(εil∗)

σβ
(r + δ )V j =
r+δ +λ

∑ αkf j ϕ(εk∗j )

(r + δ )Ui =

(1.11)

l

(1.12)

k

From equation (1.10), find function for ε̂ as a function of (Ui ,V j ) where ψ(ε) is defined as
ψ(ε) ≡ ε + r+δλ+λ ϕ(ε).
f

m

εi∗j

= ε̂(Ui ,V j ) = ψ

−1

ui j + ui j
r+δ
r+δ
Ui +
Vj −
).
(
σ
σ
σ

(3.6)

Then plug ε̂i j to (1.11) and (1.12) to find the following.
(r + δ )Ui =
(r + δ )V j =

σ (1 − β )
r+δ +λ

∑ αilm ϕ(ε̂il (Ui,Vl ))

σβ
r+δ +λ

∑ αkf j ϕ(ε̂k j (Uk ,V j ))

(3.7)

l

(3.8)

k
f

We can find Ûi and V̂ j that satisfy the equations (3.7) (3.8) as a function of all U j and
Uim respectively.
FUi (Ûi (V), V) = Ûi −
FV j (V̂ j (U), U) = V̂ j −

σ
(1 − β )
r+δ r+δ +λ

∑ αilmϕ(ε̂il (Ûi,Vl ))

σ
β
r+δ r+δ +λ

∑ αkf j ϕ(ε̂k j (Ui, V̂ j ))

(3.9)

l

(3.10)

k

Since
∂ Ûi
=
∂V j

∂ FUi
∂V j
− ∂F
Ui
∂Ui

α m [1−F(εi j )]

= −

ij
(1 − β ) r+δ
+λ F(εi j )

α m [1−F(ε )]
il )

il
il
1 + (1 − β ) ∑l r+δ
+λ F(ε

2 Since

,

(3.11)

the following proof, step2, shows a unique fixed point, I do not need the separate existence proof.
However, I state this proof to find the lower bound of ε, ε, for Proof 3.1.2
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this leads to the following properties of functions (3.9) and (3.10):
∂ Ûi

∑ | ∂V j | < 1

(3.12)

j

∂ V̂ j

∑ | ∂Ui | < 1

(3.13)

i

Then finding a equilibrium involves finding a fixed point of U∗ = {U1∗ , ...,Ui∗ , ...,UI∗ }
of the following mapping T,
T(U) = {Û1 (V̂1 (U), ..., V̂ j (U), ..., V̂J (U)), ..., Ûi (V̂1 (U), ..., V̂ j (U), ..., V̂J (U)), ...}, (3.14)
which is proven to be a contraction, kT(U0 ) − T(U00 )k < kU0 − U00 k under equations (3.12)
and (3.13) as follows. kT(U0 )−T(U00 )k = maxi |Ûi (V̂1 (U0 ), ..., V̂ j (U0 ), ..., V̂J (U0 )) −Ûi (V̂1 (U00 ),
..., V̂ j (U00 ), ..., V̂J (U00 ))| < kV̂(U0 ) − V̂(V0 )k = max j |V̂ j (U0 ) − V̂ j (U00 )| < kU0 − U00 k, where
∂ V̂

two inequalities come from the facts ∑ j | ∂∂VÛji | < 1 and ∑i | ∂Uji | < 1. For example, applying
∂ V̂ j (Uθi )
0
00
∂Ui (Ui − Ui ) where
∂ V̂ j (Uθi )
∂ V̂ j (Uθi )
∑i ∂Ui (Ui0 − Ui00 ) ≤ ∑i ∂Ui kU0 − U00 k <

the Mean Value Theorem to V̂ j (U) to get V̂ j (U0 ) − V̂ j (U00 ) = ∑i
Uθi is between U0 and U00 . It follows that
∂ V̂

kU0 − U00 k under ∑i | ∂Uji | < 1.
Applying Banach Fixed Point Theorem to this contraction mapping on a complete
metric space, RI , a unique fixed point of U∗ is established. The same logic holds for finding
V∗ , and finally εi∗j = ε̂(Ui∗ ,V j∗ )∀i, j are uniquely determined.

3.1.2

Proof of Proposition 2

Proposition 2 (The existence of a marriage market equilibrium {ε ∗ , (sm , s f )}) For any
f
m f
primitives {um
i j , ui j , F(.), σ , M(., .), µi j , λ , β , r, δ } and exogenous distributions (g , g ), the
fixed point {ε ∗ , (sm , s f )} of equations (1.13),(1.19) and (1.20) exists.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we have shown that equation (1.13) gives a solution of ε ∗
as a continuous function of (sm , s f ), denoted as ε ∗ (sm , s f ). Using this function, one can
construct mappings by stacking equations (1.19) and (1.20).
gm
i

sm
i =
1 + ∑l
f

sj =

αilm (sm ,s f )[1−F(εil∗ (sm ,s f ))]
δ +λ F(εil∗ (sm ,s f ))
f
sj
f

1 + ∑k

αk j (sm ,s f )[1−F(εk∗j (sm ,s f ))]

(1.19)

(1.20)

δ +λ F(εk∗j (sm ,s f ))

I will show that all these mappings are continuous over the compact domain [s, gm ], [s, g f ].
The lower bound for s can be found once we assume that the rate of meetings cannot ex78

ceed ( M × min{Sm , S f } ) for some finite number M. The lower bound of sm
i is evaluated at
m
the lower bound of ε, ε (from step1 of 3.1.1) and the upper bound of α , ᾱ m . Recall that
m

f

s

f

αimj = µi j M(SSm,S ) S jf . Consider the case where there are more males than females, Gm < G f .
The stock of marriages is equal to Gm − Sm and G f − S f , thus S f = G f − Gm + Sm . The
m f
f
f
gender ratio, SSm , is the decreasing function of Sm if Gm < G f , while M(SSm,S ) = M(1, SSm ) is
f
the increasing function of SSm . Under the assumption that the number of meetings at a given
time is bounded above (∑i ∑ j Mi j < M × min{Sm , S f } = MSm ), the number of marriages
1−F(ε )

ij
is also bounded above (∑i ∑ j ηi j = ∑i ∑ j Mi j δ +λ F(ε)
< MSm δ1−F(ε)
+γF(ε) ), and accordingly the

stock of male singles is bounded below, Sm =

Gm
1−F(ε)
1+M δ +γF(ε)

< Sm . One can then find the upper

bound of αimj , ᾱ m which is defined as ᾱ m ≡ maxi, j {µi j }M(1, G
m
bound of sm
i is found as si =

the existence of the

3.1.3

gm
i
1−F(ε)

f −Gm −Sm
Sm

). Finally, the lower

f

3
and also, s = mini, j {sm
i , s j } > 0. I can establish

1+J ᾱ m δ +λ F(ε)
equilibrium {ε ∗ , (sm , s f )}

by the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem.

Derivation of value functions

This subsection derives equation (1.1) where Ui denotes the expected lifetime utility of
staying single as type i male.
m
m
(r + δ )Uim = um
i + ∑ αil Emax[Uil (ε̃) −Ui , 0]

(1.1)

l

Let Ui,tm be the value of staying single for male i at t. If the length of a period is given by ∆,
Ui,tm =

1−δ∆ m
m
m
m
{u ∆ + ∑ αilm ∆ E max[Uil,t+∆
(ε̃),Ui,t+∆
] + (1 − ∑ αilm ∆)Ui,t+∆
+ o(∆)}.
1 + r∆ i
l
l

The right-hand side is the expected value of living to t + ∆, in which the type i male gets
flow utilities of um
i ∆ (this will be normalized to 0) and receives meeting opportunities with
different female types with probabilities αimj ∆. o(∆) captures the payoff in the event of more
than one Poisson arrival in a period, and therefore satisfies
both equations to get

o(∆)
∆

→ 0 as ∆ → 0. Arrange

m
m
m
(1 + r∆)Ui,tm = (1 − δ ∆){um
i ∆ + ∑ αil ∆ E max[Uil,t+∆ (ε̃),Ui,t+∆ ]
l
m
+ o(∆)}.
+ (1 − ∑ αilm ∆)Ui,t+∆
l
3 Note

that

1−F(ε)
δ +λ F(ε)

decreases in ε and is maximized at ε.
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m
m
−Ui,tm )] + δ ∆Ui,tm from both sides and rearrange.
− (Ui,t+∆
Subtract Ui,tm ≡ (1 − δ ∆)[Ui,t+∆
m
m
m
(r∆ + δ ∆)Ui,tm = (1 − δ ∆){um
i ∆ + ∑ αil ∆ E max[Uil,t+∆ (ε̃) −Ui,t+∆ , 0] + o(∆)
l
m
+ (Ui,t+∆
−Ui,tm )}

Divide both sides by ∆.
(r + δ )Ui,tm

=

(1 − δ ∆){um
i +

∑

αilm

m
m
E max[Uil,t+∆
(ε̃) −Ui,t+∆
, 0] +

l

m
m
o(∆) Ui,t+∆ −Ui,t
+
}
∆
∆

As ∆ → 0 we have
m

m
m
m
(r + δ )Ui,tm = um
i + ∑ αil E max[Uil,t (ε̃) −Ui,t , 0] + U̇i,t .
l

Note the similarity of this to asset flow value equations. The return of the asset in a small
period equals the sum of the instantaneous payoff and the expected excess value of any
m
changes in the value of states. In the stationary environment where U̇it = 0 and Uitm = Uim
for all t, we finally obtain equation (1.1).
m
m
m
(r + δ )Uim = um
i + ∑ αil Emax[Uil (ε̃) −Ui , 0]

(1.1)

l

3.2

Data Construction

1. PSID data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID 1968-2011) includes longitudinal information on individual characteristics and marriage histories. I combine three major
data sets: 1) family data (1968-1996 recorded annually, 1997-2011 recorded biannually) that contain characteristics of households and household members (mainly
a financially responsible single adult or a husband and a wife) in a given year, 2)
marriage history data (2011) that record marital transitions (transition to and from
the first and the most recent marriage and all marriage transitions that occurred after 1985), and 3) individual data (2011) that carry basic information on all surveyed
individuals and how their information is presented in each family data.
2. Sample selection
I consider racial/ethnic types (white, black and Hispanic) of individuals and their
spouses. I use information on self-reported and first mentioned race and ethnicity
from family files. Regardless of their race, if individuals report themselves as Hispanic descent in response to the question on ethnicity, they are categorized as Hispanic.4 PSID had oversampled Hispanic households for the Latino Wave from 1990
4 The

question on race is asked several times over survey years. I choose their report from the earliest
years from 1985 to 2011. I then use information from 1968-1984, considering that in those years some race
identifications are automatically coded based on their parents’ race. 97.5 % of samples’ report of their race
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to 1995. I did not use information from 241 non-Hispanics in the Latino wave, considering the possibility of oversampling non-Hispanics who marry Hispanics. Their
marriages are still captured by Hispanic spouses of the Latino wave. Finally, information on 12,967 whites, 7,790 blacks, 4,972 Hispanics is used in the analysis. 641
non-Hispanic others are dropped due to small sample size.
3. Singlehood durations
I construct singlehood spells from the marriage history data. Although the unit is
a year, I used information up to the month of the events (birth, marriage, divorce
and data collection). Information contains all singlehood durations including first
marriages and later marriages in the PSID. ‘The age at first marriage - 16’ is used
for calculating the first durations. The later durations measure the period between
the end of the previous marriage and the beginning of the new marriage.5 I restrict
singlehood durations for 50 years in which people actively participate in the marriage
market, the stages and durations up to age 65 are only captured, and the spells are
considered as censored even though some exits occur after this period. This window
(age 16-65) covers 98.5% of all exits of singlehood. Lastly, singlehood spells that
began before individuals came to the U.S. are excluded (1.1%).
4. Marriage durations
Marriage spells in the PSID data, regardless of their order, are used.6 This observation combines histories from males and females, and thus the same marriage can
be counted twice. I treated a marriage that ended with widowhood as an incomplete
spell. Marriages that began outside of the U.S are excluded (0.3%).
5. Type distributions in population
Due to the small sample size of interracial marriages, I need to pool all individuals
who had participated in the marriage market in different time periods. To determine
type distributions, I first construct the fractions of each type in population based
on PSID observations taking into account their sampling weights, which leads to
{W, B, H} = {0.755, 0.118, 0.128} for males and {W, B, H} = {0.735, 0.134, 0.131}
for females.7 The distributions in Table 1.4 based on census data are close to the
PSID sample distributions with more precise gender ratio (0.980).

3.3
3.3.1

Robustness Check
Identification and calibration of λ

The model has 2 × I × J + 1 unknowns, which are preference (ωi j ) and opportunity parameters (µi j ), and the rate of updating match quality shocks to married couples (λ ). Observed
is consistent across years. 96.1 % of individuals who are classified as white or black did not mention their
second race. Results are robust to how I determine the racial identity of samples.
5 For observations that have negative number for durations (0.5%), I adjust them to be 0.
6 For observations that have negative number for durations (0.2%), I adjust them to be 0.
7 Including non-Hispanic others (denoted as O), the distributions become {W, B, H, O} =
{0.730, 0.114, 0.124, 0.032} for males and {0.714, 0.131, 0.128, 0.028} for females.
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formation and dissolution behaviors of each marriage will be used to recover these parameters, which constitute 2 × I × J observables, hazard rate of marital formation (h0i j ) and
hazard rate of marital dissolution (h1i j ).8 Since there are more unknowns than observables,
restrictions on parameters are required to reduce the number of unknowns. I therefore fix
the value of λ and estimate preference and opportunity parameters as shown in the baseline
analysis. In this section, I will first discuss how I can estimate λ with additional restrictions
or information and how these methods justify the current choice of λ . I will then show that
key estimation results are robust to the choice of λ .
1: lower bound of λ Note first that the hazard rate of divorce is the product of
two parts; the rate of updating match quality shock λ and the probability of rejecting new
draws F(ε ∗ ), that is h1i j = λ F(εi∗j ). This implies that the level of λ should be bigger than
the highest hazard rate of divorce observed in the data.9
METHOD

2: additional restrictions on type-specific arrivals By placing some restrictions on the meeting frequencies µi j , λ can be estimated. I will assume that meetings are
uniformly random, that is, µi j = µ̆. In this case, two parameters that govern arrival of meetings and new match quality shocks, θ = (µ̆, λ ), can be simultaneously estimated based on
hazard rates recovered from the first step.10
Recall the equations (1.24), (1.26) that constitute the equilibrium hazard rate of divorce for i j marriage, h1i j , and hazard rate of marriage with a j female to a i male, h0m
ij .
METHOD

h1i j = λ F(εi∗j )
m
∗
h0m
i j = αi j [1 − F(εi j )]

(1.24)
(1.26)

Connecting two equations and applying meeting specifications yield the following
for males and females.
 √


h1i j

Sm S f f

∀i, j
µ̆ Sm S f s j 1 − λ − h0m
ij


(3.15)
π(θ , h) =
√
h1i j
m f

0f

1
−
−
h
∀i,
j
µ̆ SSm SSf sm
i
ij
λ
Estimated parameters θ̂ will minimize
π(θ , h)0 W π(θ , h)

(3.16)

where W is a 2 × I × J symmetric and positive definite matrix that defines the distance
8 Note

that the hazard rates of marital formation from the male side are not independent of those from the
female side.
9 However, the exact value of max {h1 } = h1 = 0.0236 cannot be chosen as a value of λ ; then there
ij ij
BW
∗ ) = 1). If the value close to h1
would be no BW marriages (F(εBW
BW is chosen, the rejection rate of BW
marriages should approach 1, then to have the observed BW marriage formation, αBW becomes higher. I thus
choose value 0.0241 that satisfies another reasonable condition µBW ≤ 1 (BW meetings will be less frequent
than the uniformly random process.)
10 The minimum requirement is the equalization of two parameters in m, for example, the gender symmetric
case µi j = µ ji .

82

of π(θ , h) from zero.11 I can finally obtain the minimum distance estimates and standard
errors for λ and µ̆ as follows: µ̆ = 0.1045(0.0278) λ = 0.0318(0.0069).
3: additional information on dating behaviors If the aggregate information
on meeting behaviors is available, the type-independent match quality shock generating
process to couples λ can be inferred. Assume for simplicity the model where gender is
the only characteristic. There is one threshold ε ∗ that governs formation and separation of
matches. In this simple case, F(ε1 ∗ ) is the expected number of new draws before divorce and
METHOD

1
1−F(ε ∗ )

is the expected number of meetings(dates) before marriage.12
I use this last method to calibrate the value of λ for results in the main text. I approximate the average number of meetings till marriage for females to the median number of
opposite-sex sexual partners, which is available information in National Health Statistics
Reports 2011 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). The median number of
opposite-sex sexual partners in a lifetime among females aged 15-44 years who are currently married (2006-2008) is 2.5. Given that 15.1% of them had already been married at
least two times, the number of sexual partners till marriages is obtained as 2.172.13 If we
set the level of λ at 0.0289, we can fit this target for the average number of meetings till
marriage. However, since the observed proxy for the average number of meetings is subject
to several limitations (e.g., people may underreport their number of sexual partners, not all
meetings may involve sexual contacts, not all sexual partners are considered as potential
partners), it is required to be assured that my main results are robust to the choice of λ at
the particular value.
11 I

use the identity matrix for W .
follows the geometric distribution. If the probability of acceptance on each meeting is p, then the
probability that the kth trial is the first success is Pr(X = k) = (1 − p)k−1 p for k = 1, 2, .... Its expectation is
d
∞
x−1 (where p + q = 1)= p d
x
−1 = 1 . With the case of J possible exits,
E(X) = ∑∞
x=1 xpq
dq ∑x=1 q = p dq (1 − q)
p
12 This

the expected number of meetings until marriage will be
13 The

∑Jj=1 αimj
J
∑ j=1 αimj [1−F(εi∗j )]

for male i.

number of marriages is observed in PSID samples who were aged 15-44 in year 2006-2008. Solving
the equation with one unknown to find the number of sexual partners till their marriages, x, x ∗ (0.849) + (x +
x) ∗ (0.151) = 2.5 gives x = 2.172.
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3.3.2

Robustness check with respect to λ

(a) the average number of meetings until
marriage

(b) the role of opportunities

Figure 3.1: Robustness check with respect to λ (x-axis)

The robustness check regarding the choice of λ is shown in Figure 3.1. First, note that the
final choice of λ = 0.030 lies between estimates based on the second and the third method.
It is also above the lower bound shown in the first method. The chosen value of λ = 0.030
is related to the observed mean value of meetings until marriage, 2.08.14 As shown in panel
(a) of Figure 3.1, as the value of λ becomes higher, the value for the average number of
meetings until marriage decreases. Panel (b) in Figure 3.1 demonstrates that as the value
λ increases, the importance of opportunities in explaining marital behaviors also increases.
Since the estimated hazard rates of divorce (h1i j = λ F(εi∗j )) is fitted by this higher value
of λ , the higher λ leads to the lower rejection rates F(εi∗j ) ↓, or higher acceptance rates,
[1 − F(εi j )∗ ] ↑. Given the acceptance rules, to fit the estimated hazard rates of marriage
m
∗
formation (h0m
i j = αi j [1 − F(εi j )]) with the higher acceptance rates, lower arrival rates are
m
implied, αi j ↓. If people accept meetings easily, whom they meet becomes more significant
in explaining whom they match with, which leads to the higher role of opportunities with
the higher value of λ . However, in overall ranges, the significant role of opportunities
compared to preferences can be shown. In addition, rankings among estimated parameters
are also preserved across different values of λ .

3.4

Identification of more parameters
f

recovering separate flow utilities of marriages um
i j , ui j , (σ and β ) using data on transfers
14 Across

race and gender, the number of meetings till marriage for male whites, blacks and Hispanics is
{2.05, 2.81, 1.44} and {2.06, 2.62, 1.58} for female counterparts.
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If we have information on transfers from husbands to wives15 , we can recover preferences
f
parameters um
i j and ui j separately, still based on the assumptions on bargaining parameter β
and the dispersion of F(.) σ using the following likelihood function.
j

l(τ0c , γ0c , dck , τ1c , γ1c ,tc ) = ∏ exp{−∑ αimj [1 − F(εi∗j )]τ0c }[∏(αimj [1 − F(εi∗j )])dc ]1−γ0c
c

j

j

j

∏[exp{−λ F(εi∗j )τ1c}(λ F(εi∗j ))1−γ1c f (tc|ε ≥ εi∗j )]dc

(3.17)

j

The equilibrium transfers are given as follows.
σ β (1 − β )
1
f
f
{∑ αilm ϕ(εil∗ ) − ∑ αk j ϕ(εk∗j )}
ti j (ε) = β um
i j − (1 − β )ui j + σ (β − )ε −
2
r+δ +λ l
k
(3.18)
I assume F(.) the standard normal distribution and yield


f
f
σ β (1−β )
m
∗
∗
m
tc − β ui j + (1 − β )ui j + r+δ +λ {∑ αil ϕ(εil ) − ∑ αk j ϕ(εk j )}


1
l
k


f (tc ) =
φ

1
1
σ (β − 2 )
σ (β − 2 )
(3.19)
f (tc |ε ≥ εi∗j ) =

f (tc )
1 − Φ(εi∗j )

(3.20)
um +u

f

Up to Step 3 even without the information on transfers, i j σ i j , the total flow utility from
f
marriage i, j, and αimj , αi j , the arrival rate of j females to i males, can be recovered. If
the data on transfers are available, one can additionally recover σ (β − 12 ) and −β um
ij +
β (1−β )
m
∗
∗
(1 − β )ui j + σr+δ
+λ {∑ αik ϕ(εik ) − ∑ αl j ϕ(εl j )} and the functional form of F(.) above
f

f

k

l
f

16
threshold values. To recover separately um
i j and ui j , I need to assume one of β or σ .
15 Household

bargaining outcomes ti j can be measured based on the survey questions on division of household chores, whether a husband or a wife had contraceptive operations, subject evaluation on the fairness in
several areas, gender specific consumption.
16 This discussion can be made based on population moments. Note also the followings
1
σ β (1 − β )
f
∗
E[ti j |ε ≥ εi∗j ] = β um
{ αilm ϕ(εil∗ ) − ∑ αkf j ϕ(εk∗j )}
i j − (1 − β )ui j + σ (β − )E[ε|ε ≥ εi j ] −
2
r+δ +λ ∑
l
k
1
σ β (1 − β )
f
∗
= β um
{ αilm ϕ(εil∗ ) − ∑ αkf j ϕ(εk∗j )}
i j − (1 − β )ui j + σ (β − )λ̃ (εi j ) −
2
r+δ +λ ∑
l
k
1
1
V[ti j |ε ≥ εi∗j ] = σ 2 (β − )2 V[εi j |ε ≥ εi∗j ] = σ 2 (β − )2 (1 − λ̃ (εi∗j )[λ̃ (εi∗j ) − εi∗j ]).
2
2
Define the inverse Mills ratio(IMR) λ̃ (εi∗j ) ≡

φ (εi∗j )
1−Φ(εi∗j ) .

Note that E[ε|ε ≥ εi∗j ] = λ̃ (εi∗j ).
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(eq10)
(eq11)

3.5

Application to one-sided models

Assume a situation where there are i consumers and j goods. Researchers are interested in
two parameters: 1) arrival rate of good j to consumer type i (αi j ), and 2) utility of type i
from consuming good j (ωi j ). There are also idiosyncratic and stochastic consumer tastes
ε. After purchasing an item, the consumer updates his or her taste shock according to the
Poisson rate of λ . If this taste shock falls too low, the consumer may decide to stop using
this good. Then the value function of type i consuming item j upon shock realization ε,
Vi j (ε), and the value function of type i who does not buy an item yet and is waiting for
arrivals, Vi , are given by
rVi j (ε) = ωi j + ε + λ Emax[Ui j (ε̃) −Ui j (ε),Ui −Ui j (ε)]
rVi = ∑ αi j Emax[Ui j (ε̃) −Ui ].

(3.21)
(3.22)

j

Threshold shocks, ε ∗ , will be solved from the following
´ ∞ conditions where function ϕ(.)
∗
depends on the distribution of taste shock ε, ϕ(ε ) = ε ∗ [1 − F(x)]dx.
rVi j (εi∗j ) = rVi
ω + εi∗j +

αi j
λ
ϕ(εi∗j ) = ∑
ϕ(εi∗j )
r+λ
j r+λ

(3.23)
(3.24)

With observed durations before consumers choose one good, the type of good the
consumers select, and durations of the consumers using the good, researchers can disentangle between αi j and F(εi j ). This decomposition is based on estimated hazard rates of
transition into consuming good j (h0i j ) and estimated hazard rates of transition out of consuming good j (h1i j ). Given α and ε ∗ , preference parameters are then recovered based on
equation (3.24).
h1i j = λ F(εi∗j )

(3.25)

h0i j = αi j [1 − F(εi∗j )]

(3.26)

The crucial identification assumption is that λ , the arrival of a new taste shock to
consumers who are currently using this good, is type-independent and calibrated outside of
the model based on, for example, the average number of arrivals until purchase. In other
cases, type-independent λ can be assumed if information of this level is known from independent sources (rather than durations of usage data), such as technical reports or testings
with the sample of consumers. It is also critical that opportunities arrive only before purchasing the good, not after purchasing. These identifying assumptions can be restrictive in
analyzing some markets.

86

3.6

Additional tables

Table 3.1: Experiment: balanced gender ratio for blacks (non-institutional population)
balanced black gender ratio
W
B
H
S
index
white male
0.718 0.002 0.020 0.259 0.865
white female
0.706 0.007 0.022 0.266 0.833
black male
0.039 0.534 0.023 0.405 0.884
black female
0.013 0.524 0.019 0.443 0.934
Hispanic male
0.141 0.022 0.608 0.229 0.758
Hispanic female 0.128 0.025 0.603 0.244 0.768
Total
(inter marriage=6.1%)
0.839

baseline
W
B
H
S
0.719 0.003 0.021 0.257
0.707 0.005 0.022 0.266
0.036 0.567 0.021 0.377
0.016 0.469 0.022 0.494
0.139 0.026 0.610 0.225
0.130 0.020 0.605 0.246
(inter marriage=6.0%)

index
0.857
0.837
0.900
0.917
0.757
0.773
0.837

Notes: Predicted type distribution in steady-state stocks. Fraction in each state: being married to column type spouses (W:white, B:black,
H:Hispanic), or being single (S:single). Balanced black gender ratio: model outcomes under the increased measure of black males from
the type distribution in 2000. Baseline: model outcomes under the type distribution of non-institutional population in 2000.
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Chapter 4
Appendix to Chapter 2
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4.1

Proofs

4.1.1

Proof of Proposition 1

Proposition 1. Two types of pure strategy equilibria. Under the Nash Bargaining solution given in Lemma 1, there are two types of pure strategy equilibria. If the penalty for
x(1+2x)Q
intermarriage is high, τ ≥ τ ∗ ≡ 2(x+g)(x+(1−g))
, only homogamous marriages (AA, BB)
are formed in the equilibrium (the homogamous equilibrium). If τ < τ ∗ , all matches
(AA, BB, AB, BA) are formed in the equilibrium (the all-matches equilibrium).
Proof. Under Lemma 1, there are eight potential types of pure strategy equilibria, where
three indicator functions {βAA , βBB , βAB (= βBA )} take value from {0, 1}. I will first show
that the only possible equilibrium types are {βAA , βBB , βAB } = {1, 1, 0}, {1, 1, 1}, by excluding other 6 cases.
First, at least one type is rejecting all matches, {βAA , βBB , βAB } = {0, 0, 0}, {1, 0, 0},
{0, 1, 0}, cannot be an equilibrium outcome, since then one of Vi = 0, i ∈ {A, B} are always
smaller than Vii = Q. Second, rejecting homogamous matches and accepting heretogamous matches, {βAA , βBB , βAB } = {0, 0, 1}, cannot be an equilibrium, since 2Q > 2(Q − τ)
= VAB + VBA ≥ VA + VB ≥ min{2VA , 2VB } contradicts Q < VA or Q < VB . Third, if they
accept intermarriages, both types should accept homogamous marriages. In other words,
{βAA , βBB , βAB } = {1, 0, 1},{0, 1, 1} cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose, to the contrary, B
types reject their BB marriages, while A types accept all marriages, AA, AB. This will be
the case where VB > Q ≥ VA and 2(Q − τ) ≥ (VA + VB ). Then the values of being single
A −VB
A −VB
and rVB = αg 2(Q−τ)−V
. Using
become rVA = αg(Q − VA ) + α(1 − g) 2(Q−τ)−V
2
2
these two equations, two unknowns (VA ,VB ) can be found VA =

Q(α 2 g2 +2αr)−2(1−g)αrτ
α 2 g2 +2αgr+2r2 +αr

and

(Q−τ)(α 2 g2 +2αr)−α 2 g2 τ

VB = α 2 g2 +2αgr+2r2 +αr , leading to VB < Q, which is a contradiction. This shows that
by accepting only intermarriages, members of group B cannot collect enough surpluses to
reject their homogamous marriages.
Let us then consider the equilibrium where all marriages are accepted (all-matches
equilibrium), which gives the following equations:
2(Q − τ) −VA −VB
2
2(Q − τ) −VA −VB
rVB = α(1 − g)(Q −VB ) + αg
2
rVA = αg(Q −VA ) + α(1 − g)

(4.1)
(4.2)

By solving two equations with two unknowns, the following matching outcomes are obtained.
Q(1 + 2x) − 2(1 − g)(1 − g + x)t
1 + 3x + 2x2
Q(1 + 2x) − 2g(g + x)t
VB =
1 + 3x + 2x2
VA =
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(4.3)
(4.4)

Note that the conditions for acceptance of homogamous marriages (Q ≥ VA , Q ≥ VB ) always
hold. For intermarriages to be accepted, (Q − τ) ≥ VA +VB is required, which leads to the
condition:
τ ≤ τ1∗ ≡

x(1 + 2x)Q
2(g − g2 + x + x2 )

(4.5)

For the equilibrium where only homogamous marriages are accepted (homogamous
equilibrium), values functions take simple forms:
rVA = αg(Q −VA )
rVB = α(1 − g)(Q −VB )

(4.6)
(4.7)

which lead to the following solutions:
gQ
g+x
(1 − g)Q
VB =
1−g+x

VA =

(4.8)
(4.9)

The conditions for accepting homogamous marriages (Q ≥ VA , Q ≥ VB ) are again always
satisfied. For intermarriages to be rejected, (Q − τ) < VA + VB is required, which leads to
the condition:
τ > τ0∗ ≡

x(1 + 2x)Q
2(g − g2 + x + x2 )

(4.10)

Since two conditions, shown in equations (4.5) and (4.10), depend on the same threshold,
x(1+2x)Q
τ ∗ = τ0∗ = τ1∗ = 2(g−g
2 +x+x2 ) , there is only one pure strategy equilibrium at given parameter
values.

4.1.2

Proof of Proposition 3 and 4

Proposition 3. The existence and uniqueness of the frictionless market equilibrium.
Under symmetric frictionless settings with two types, there exists a unique marriage market
equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Negative group size effects. Regardless of utility specifications, the group
size effect is always positive. In other words, as the fraction of i increases, the marital
prospects of type i decreases.
Proof. Assume that type A (B) gets uAA (uBB ) from homogamous marriage and uAB (uBA )
from intermarriage.
Let µi be the measure of i type singles and let µi j be the measure of marriage between
i husbands and j wives. Based on equations (2.18) and (2.19), the measure of each marriage
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type is determined as follows.
lnµAA = lnµA + uAA
lnµBB = lnµB + uBB
lnµAB = lnµA + uAB + tB→A
= lnµB + uBA + tA→B

(4.11)
(4.12)
(4.13)
(4.14)

Due to gender symmetry, there is no transfer in homogamous marriages. In addition, the
measure of AB marriages is equal to that of BA marriages (µAB = µBA ). Transfers should
be consistent with this gender symmetry assumption, and thus what type A gets from type
B is the negative value of what type A gives to type B (tB→A = −tA→B ).
Based on the market clearing condition, the measure of marriage is connected by the
utility specification, as shown in equation (1.43).
µAB = exp{

uAB + uBA √
} µA µB
2

(4.15)

Moreover, the measures in each state should be consistent with the fraction of each
type. The measure of type A and B single can be found at given tB→A .
g = µA + µAA + µAB
= µA [1 + euAA + euAB + tB→A ]
1 − g = µB + µBB + µBA
= µB [1 + euBB + euBA − tB→A ]

(4.16)
(4.17)

By equating equations (4.13) and (4.15) given equations (4.16) and (4.17), I can solve
for tB→A from the following quadratic equation,
µA euAB e−tB→A = e

uAB +uBA
2

√

µA µB

(4.18)

which leads to


1
e−uAB (euAB +uBA (1 − 2g)+
2(1 + euBB )g

q
u
+u
u
+u
2
u
u
e AB BA (e AB BA (1 − 2g) + 4(1 + e AA )(1 + e BB )(1 − g)g ) .
tB→A = ln

(4.19)

The measure of type singles can be found at given tB→A by equations (4.16) and
(4.17). Once µA is known, other measures µAA , µAB can be obtained accordingly, based on
equations (4.11) and (4.13).
√

µA =
1 + euAA +

euAB +uBA (1−2g)+

g

euAB +uBA (euAB +uBA (1−2g)2 +4(1+euAA )(1+euBB )(1−g)g

(4.20)

2(1+euBB )g

uAA

(4.21)

uAB +tB→A

(4.22)

µAA = µA e
µAB = µA e
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Moreover, type i’s expected value of being single before he sees his realization of
disturbances, EUA , is given by the following where c is Euler’s constant (' 0.5772157)1
 
g
EUA =c + ln
(4.23)
µA
=c + ln [1 + euAA +
(4.24)
#
p
euAB +uBA (1 − 2g) + euAB +uBA (euAB +uBA (1 − 2g)2 + 4(1 + euAA )(1 + euBB )(1 − g)g
2(1 + euBB )g
What is noteworthy is that the utility of being a type i decreases as the fraction of
type i increases. This property does not depend on utility specifications.
euAB +uBA
∂ EUA
=− p
∂g
g euAB +uBA (euAB +uBA (1 − 2g)2 + 4(1 + euAA )(1 + euBB )(1 − g)g

1 For

the derivation, see Choo and Siow (2006b).
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(4.25)
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